

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

GO WORLD

Spring 1990 NO.59



THE ISHI PRESS

GO POST CARDS

The Ishi Press has just published two sets of post cards featuring wood block prints with go as the main theme. Each set contains eight cards, with a different print depicted on each card, for a total of 16 different prints. Some of the prints in these sets have appeared on Go World covers (GW13, GW23, GW24, GW31, & GW38), and a variety of famous artists (Harunobu, Kuniyoshi, Toyokuni, Hiroshige, etc.) are represented. These post cards are the ideal medium for sending messages to your friends and arousing their curiosity about the world's most fascinating game.

Below are four of the prints included in these two sets.



Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1798–1861)
Sato Tadanobu crushing two foes with a go board while wrestling with a third (1830)



Toyokuni III (1786–1867)
Chinese generals playing go (1847)



Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1798–1861)
A 14th-century general drawing inspiration from the go board (1850)



Toyokuni III (1786–1867)
Two courtesans with a go board in the background (1861)

In North America, order from:

Ishi Press International
1400 N. Shoreline Blvd., Building A7
Mountain View, California
USA 94043
Price: \$6.00 per set plus \$1.00 s/h per order.

All other countries order from:

The Ishi Press, Inc.
CPO Box 2126
Tokyo, Japan
Price: ¥1,200 per set (including shipping and handling)


Featured Articles in This Issue

Two Firsts

Tewari

The first-ever article in English on *tewari*, a much-used but little-analysed professional technique for evaluating the efficiency of the moves one has played. The idea is to remove superfluous stones after a sequence has been played and to look at the core shape; a comparison with standard josekis or sequences known to give even results is then made to assess the result. Professionals use this technique as a matter of course, but until now there has been no proper discussion of it in English. That situation is remedied in our article, beginning on page 59.

When to play on the 2nd line



The 2nd line is known as 'the line of defeat', which seems to be a pretty clear warning to keep away from it, but sometimes you have to play there very early in the game. Working out when it's correct and when it's wrong by making your own analysis of professional games is the hard way to solve the problem. The easy way is to read our comprehensive article in this issue. This topic is another first for an instruction article in English. Our lucid analysis presents clear and simple criteria for deciding when a move on the second line is necessary.

Our Cover

A scene from the Takegawa chapter of *The Tale of Genji*, showing a best-of-three match, the stake being the old cherry tree in the garden. This painting is given on the ¥120 stamp

How Cho Hun-hyun made \$400,000

In this issue we present the final two games from the 1st Ing Cup title match, which featured a clash between two of the super stars of international go, Cho Hun-hyun of Korea and Nie Weiping of China.



Cho Hun-hyun's three wins in the title match were the most valuable wins in go history, besides which they made him a national hero in Korea.

1,000 Games — and 1,000 wins

In the March tournament this year yokozuna Chiyonofuji became the first sumo wrestler ever to notch 1,000 wins in the top division. The yokozuna of the go world is Sakata Eio, who beat Chiyonofuji to the 1,000-win mark by nearly four years, though in a somewhat different arena. In our *Go Topics*, *Go Trivia* column this issue, we review Sakata's achievement and also look at the records of a group of younger players who all reached the 1,000-game landmark in their careers last autumn.

issued by the Japanese post office last October, together with an ¥80 stamp shown on the cover of GW58. *Reproduced by permission of the Tokugawa Reimeikai.*

CONTENTS

Go World News	3
Kido Prizes for 1989	6
The 14th Kisei Title Match (Kobayashi v. Otake)	7
Game One	7
Game Two	11
The 1st Ing Cup (Cho Hun-hyun v. Nie Weiping)	14
Game Four	14
Game Five	18
The 14th Meijin Title (Kobayashi Koichi v. Awaji)	23
Game Three	23
Game Four	30
Game Five	35
The 2nd IBM Lightning Go Championship (Otake v. Ishida)	39
The 28th Judan Title, Game One	42
38 Tesuji Patterns	43
38 Life and Death Patterns	43
Two Semeai Problems	46
The Second Line: When to Play on It, When to Leave It Alone	47
Two Tesuji Problems	47
Good Style and Correct Shape	54
Go Topics, Go Trivia	55
Tewari: How to Analyse the Efficiency of Your Stones	59

Go World is published by The Ishi Press, Inc.
 Address subscriptions to: The Ishi Press, Inc.
 CPO Box 2126, Tokyo, Japan
 Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: ¥5,000 (4 issues)
 Price per single issue: ¥1,250
 Airmail rate: ¥1,800 per issue; ¥7,200 a year
 Prices for back issues 1, 7—58: ¥1,250@

U.S. and Canadian subscribers should order from:
ISHI PRESS INTERNATIONAL
 1400 North Shoreline Blvd., Building A7
 Mountain View, California 94043

Go World is published quarterly and is distributed in the U.S. for \$15.00 per year by Ishi Press International, 1400 Shoreline Blvd., Building A7, Mountain View, CA 94043. Second-class postage paid at Mountain View, California.
 POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Go World, 1400 North Shoreline Blvd., Building A7, Mountain View, CA 94043.

Note: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

© Copyright 1990 in Japan by The Ishi Press, Inc. ISSN 0286-0376

All rights reserved according to international law. This magazine or any parts thereof may not be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher.

Go World News

International News

More Upsets in the Fujitsu Cup

Jimmy Cha beats Cho Chikun, Takemiya loses to 14-year-old from Korea

The 3rd Fujitsu Cup was the most eventful yet, with even more surprises than last year. Jimmy Cha, the Korean 4-dan who plays for the U.S.A., made news yet again, pulling off an even bigger upset than last year. On the receiving end of the Cha magic was Cho Chikun Honinbo. Cho took an early lead in their game, but an overplay gave Jimmy the chance to complicate the game. The whole board became one big fight and an enormous trade took place; when the dust settled, Jimmy was ahead. He won by 4 1/2 points.

The other big upset was two-time champion Takemiya's loss to the 14-year-old Korean player Lee Chang-ho 4-dan. Lee let Takemiya set up an enormous moyo, then came in and destroyed it from the inside. He won by 5 1/2 points.

Full results of the first two rounds are:

Round 1. Kobayashi Koichi beat D. Lee of Brazil, Lee Chang-ho beat Perng of Taiwan, Yang 6-dan (Korea) beat Ishida Yoshio, Sakata beat Zhang Wendong 7-dan (China), Ohira beat Jiang Zhujiu 9-dan (China), Cho Chikun beat Yoo 3-dan (Korea), Yamashiro 9-dan beat Tsao Dayuan 9-dan (China), Otake beat Matthew Macfadyen (U.K.).

Round 2. Kobayashi beat Wang Jianhong 7-dan (China), Lee beat Takemiya, O Rissei (playing for Taiwan) beat Sakata, Nie Weiping beat Ohira, Jimmy Cha beat Cho Chikun, Yamashiro beat Suh Bong-soo 9-dan (Korea), Cho Hun-hyun beat Otake, Rin beat Yang.

The pairings in the third round, to be played in Seoul on 2 June, are: Kobayashi v. Lee, Rin v. O Rissei, Nie v. Cha, Yamashiro v. Cho Hun-hyun.

We hope to present some of the most interesting games in our next issue.

Young Chinese Team Scores Resounding Victory in 18th Japan-China Goodwill Matches

The alternating tours made by Japanese and Chinese teams used to be the highlight of the year in international go, but now there are so many international tournaments that these tours are used to give experience to younger players. Last year a Japanese team led by Komatsu 6-dan toured China and just managed to post a plus record, with 29 wins to 27 losses. This year it was the turn of the Chinese to visit Japan, and they sent a team of eight players under 28 and under 8-dan. The defending side fielded various teams of players under 8-dan and under 26 in a series of seven matches played between 19 and 30 April.

The result was an overwhelming victory for the touring team, which scored 38 wins to 18 losses. This was Japan's 2nd-worst result (the worst was 13-43 when a Chinese team toured Japan in 1982). The Japanese also lost one of the matches 0-8, the second time this has happened. Individual best-of-three matches were held in the 5th to 7th rounds of the tour, and here too the Chinese did very well, winning six out of eight. The results of this tour show once again that Japan doesn't seem to be developing a new generation of go players capable of replacing the current top players when they pass their peak.

Most successful of the tourists was Liao Guiyong 7-dan, who won all of his games. Two players had 6-1 records: Shao 4-dan and Zhang Xuan 7-dan. Zhang is one of the top women players in China. Another woman who did well, with 5-2, is Yang Hui 7-dan, the wife of Tsao 9-dan.

News from Japan

Kobayashi Honinbo Challenger

Luck deserted Sakata Eio right at the end of the 45th Honinbo league. After leading all the way and dominating news coverage of the league, Sakata slipped up in his final-round game against the player who was his great rival and nemesis in the 1960's, Rin Kaiho. Sakata lost this game, while both Kobayashi

45th Honinbo League Title-holder : Cho Chikun

Rank	Player	T	O	K K	K	F	S	R	Y	Score	Place
1	Takemiya	—	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	3 — 4	—
2	Otake	1	—	1	0	1	0	1	1	5 — 2	1
3	Kobayashi K.	1	0	—	1	1	1	1	0	5 — 2	1
4	Kataoka	0	1	0	—	1	0	0	1	3 — 4	—
5	Fujisawa S.	0	0	0	0	—	0	0	0	0 — 7	—
5	Sakata	1	1	0	1	1	—	0	1	5 — 2	1
5	Rin Kaiho	1	0	0	1	1	1	—	0	4 — 3	4
5	Yoda	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	—	3 — 4	—

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

and Otake won theirs (all played on 12 April), so the result was that three players tied for first on 5-2. Unfortunately, the rule is that only the two higher-ranked players in a multiple tie qualify for the playoff, so go fans missed the chance of seeing a 70-year-old make history by challenging for a big title.

Sakata was not the only player to come to grief in the final round. Six-time title winner Takemiya was eliminated from the league when he lost to Kobayashi. Kataoka and Yoda also lost their places, along with Shuko, whose elimination was decided some time ago. Rin hung on to his place by virtue of his win over Sakata.

Kobayashi won the playoff with Otake, held on 16 April. This will be his second challenge for the Honinbo title. Last time, in 1982, he lost 2-4 to Cho after taking a 2-1 lead. These days Cho is not enjoying the form he did in the early 80s, so Kobayashi has a good chance of monopolizing the big three titles.

The first game will be played on 11 and 12 May. In an unprecedented publicity campaign, the Mainichi is going to hold simultaneous public commentaries by high-ranking professionals at 47 different locations throughout Japan. No Japanese go fan will be able to complain that he can't get to a commentary.

Lead Changes in Meijin League

Yoda and Cho both suffered their second losses, so they have dropped out of the lead in the Meijin league. Takemiya and Otake are now on top, though everyone except Rin and Kato, who have both lost four games, is still in the running. Kato seems to have completely lost the knack of winning, while Rin's poor start is a shock from a player who's usually so consistent.

Takemiya Takes the Judan Title

Recently Takemiya has experienced perhaps the wildest swing ever in his form. In March

15th Meijin League (as of 30 April 1990) Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi

Rank	Player	A	R	T	C	H	K	O	F	Y	Score
1	Awaji	—		1	1		1		0	0	3 — 2
2	Rin		—	0	1	0		0	0		1 — 4
3	Takemiya	0	1	—				1		1	3 — 1
4	Cho Chikun	0	0		—		1		1	1	3 — 2
5	Honda		1			—	1	0	1	0	3 — 2
6	Kato	0			0	0	—	0			0 — 4
7	Otake		1	0		1	1	—			3 — 1
7	Fujisawa S.	1	1		0	0			—	0	2 — 3
7	Yoda	1		0	0	1			1	—	3 — 2

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.



Takemiya starts the Judan title match with an impressive win. He went on to take the title 3-2.

he was on top of the world, winning the first two games of the 28th Judan title match and beating Cho Hun-hyun 2-0 in a match between the Fujitsu and Ing world champions. Then in April he was unceremoniously bundled out of the 3rd Fujitsu Cup in the second round by a 14-year-old, Cho Chikun fought back to even the score in the Judan title, and he lost his place in the Honinbo league. First he couldn't do anything wrong, then he couldn't do anything right.

However, the pendulum has swung right back: on 26 April he defeated Cho Chikun by half a point in the fifth Judan game to win his first open title ever apart from the Honinbo title. This may seem astonishing for a player of Takemiya's calibre, but he has always reserved his best efforts for the Honinbo title, which he has won six times. His record of winning a big-three title so often without ever taking one of the lesser titles was unique. In fact, he had made five challenges for other titles, but Game One of this year's Judan title match was his first win in a best-of-five match.

Takemiya was very happy at coming out of his mysterious slump. Cho, on the other hand, now finds himself under a lot of pressure: with three titles to his credit, he stood shoulder to shoulder with Kobayashi Koichi at the peak of the go world, but, having lost the Tengen title to Rin at the end of last year and now the Judan title, he is reduced to one title.

Moreover, Kobayashi is the challenger for the Honinbo title. If Cho loses his last title, he will be completely eclipsed by his rival.

The results:

Game 1 (8 March). Takemiya (W) won by resig. Game 2 (28 March). Takemiya (B) won by resig. Game 3 (4 April). Cho (B) won by 4 1/2 points. Game 4 (19 April). Cho (W) won by resig. Game 5 (26 April). Takemiya (W) won by 1/2 point. Game 1 is given on page 42.

News from Korea

Cho Hun-hyun Defends Wangwi Title

Cho's domination of Korean titles continues, with his latest triumph being a 4-0 victory over Suh Bong-soo, the challenger for the 24th Wangwi title. Cho has now won this title nine years in a row.

Japanese Mini-tour

Three top young Japanese players made a short tour of Korea in March and played two matches against Korean counterparts. The result was an amicable 3-3 draw.

Match 1. Lee Chang-ho 4-dan beat Imamura 8-dan by half a point, Yoo 3-dan lost to Komatsu 7-dan (Yoo resigned), Jeong 3-dan beat Hiroe 6-dan by 13 1/2 points.

Match 2. Lee lost to Komatsu (Lee resigned), Yoo beat Hiroe (resigned), Jeong lost to Imamura by 3 1/2 points.

Kido Prizes for 1989

In its March issue every year, *Kido* announces its prizes for the top players of the previous year. The selections are made by a group of journalists representing the newspapers and TV stations sponsoring tournaments. These prizes were founded in 1967, and since there are a number of special prizes, their disposition gives a slightly different perspective on the go scene. One point that should be noted is that the very top players are not considered for the 5th to 7th prizes: if they don't qualify for the top prize, they're out of the running. For some reason, we have neglected to report on the 1987 and 1988 prizes (the prizes for 1986 can be found on page 5 of GW47), so we have included the winners for those years in parentheses.

1. Outstanding player of the year: Kobayashi Koichi, for winning the Kisei, Meijin, Gosei and Japan-China Meijin titles. This was a unanimous choice of the ten journalists on the committee. (1987: Kato; 1988: Kobayashi)

2. Highest number of wins: Yoda Norimoto 7-dan: 51 wins, 15 losses. Yoda comfortably surpassed the previous record of 46 wins, set by Kato and Cho in 1976. He also beat Cho's record of 64 games played (also set in 1976). (Cho: 40-23; Ogata 7-dan: 39-13)

3. Best winning percentage (7-dan and up): Yoda: 77.3%. (Ohira: 83.8%; Hane, Kobayashi Satoru: 80%)

4. Most consecutive wins (7-dan and up): Yoda: 16 in a row. Yoda was also second, with another winning streak of 12. (Ohira: 17; Kobayashi Koichi, Yoda: 12)


5. The fighting spirit prize: Yoda. (Awaji; Miyazaki Shimako)

6. The prize for technique: Yoda. (Ohira; Hane)

7. The special merit prize: Awaji Shuzo 9-dan, for winning the Meijin league. (Yoda; Yoda)

8. The outstanding woman player: Aoki Kikuyo 3-dan, who didn't win a title in 1989 but scored 26 wins to 13 losses (including 18-10 against male players). The condition for this prize is that the player have a plus record, so

Kusunoki, who won the Women's Honinbo but scored 14-18, and Kobayashi Chizu, who won the Women's Kakusei but had overall results for the year of 12-18, were not eligible. Only seven women (out of 35 in the Nihon Ki-in) had plus records. (Miyazaki; Miyazaki)



Yoda Norimoto rewrote the record books last year — highest number of wins in one year, record total of games played — and received five Kido prizes in recognition, which is two more than anyone else has received in one year. Yoda also extended his own record in the Shinjin-O title, winning it for the fourth time. No other player has won it more than twice (it's restricted to players under 8-dan).

9. The 'new face' prize: not awarded. (Komatsu Hideki; Mimura Tomoyasu)

10. International prize: Iwamoto Kaoru, whose efforts resulted in the completion of an international go centre in Sao Paulo, Brazil last year. The funds came from money Iwamoto donated to the Nihon Ki-in. The globe-trotting Iwamoto, who turned 88 in February this year, is now working on creating go centres in Europe and the U.S.A. The international prize is a new prize created last year to recognize Takemiya's achievement in winning the 1st Fujitsu Cup in 1988.

The 14th Kisei Title Match

Kobayashi Koichi continues to dominate the go scene in Japan: not content with holding the Kisei and Meijin titles, he is now about to launch a challenge for the Honinbo title. He has also won his way to the quarter-finals of the 3rd Fujitsu Cup, and if he can get past the redoubtable 14-year-old Korean representative Lee Chang-ho, he has to be considered a serious threat there too. If he can win either the Honinbo title or the Fujitsu Cup, he will have a very good chance of passing the 100 million yen mark in prize money this year, which will open a new era in professional go in Japan.

In our previous issue, we promised to present the Kisei title match in this issue, but for reasons of space we are only able to keep two fifths of our promise. We've written so much about Kobayashi in recent issues that we will dispense with further preliminaries and go straight on to the first game.

Game One: Otake Overwhelmed by Kobayashi's Power


White: Otake Hideo 9-dan

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Komi: 5 1/2; **time:** 8 hours each.

Played in Düsseldorf on 17 January 1990.

Commentary by Kato Masao Oza.



Dia. 1: alternative

Figure 1 (1-27). Focus on the right side

The evaluation of the pattern to 17, in which one move serves as an extension from both the top and the bottom positions, will vary according to individual preference. I give the verdict to Black, for the way in which this simplifies his game, but there are quite a few players of the Kitani type who would be grateful for having been allowed to attach and pull back (*tsukehiki*) in two places. Perhaps Otake

was thinking of Kitani Sensei when he played this opening.





Figure 1 (1-27)

In the exchange that follows White 18, both players are emphasizing their unwillingness to play in the worthless area at the bottom. [White's low stone at 16 means that neither player has much potential for development to the right of 16.] However, the continuation from 20 is not the only way to play. White 1 in *Dia. 1* would also be a powerful strategy. To give one example, the joseki from 2, which scoops out White's base, is a favourite of Kobayashi's, but wouldn't this also be reasonable for White? Note that another good variation is playing 11 at 12, followed by Black 'a'. The commonplace joseki of Black 2 at 11, White 'b', Black 'c' alone is out of the question.


Black 27 should be an instructive move for amateur players. The players want to focus on the right side rather than on the bottom, so extending to A would give Black nothing to look forward to; White would slide along the side at B and the game would be over.

Up to 27 there is an identical game. In the 1989 Meijin-league game between Cho Chikun and Ishida Yoshio, Ishida jumped to 1 in *Dia. 2* (next page) instead of White 28. However worthless the bottom area may be, a white pincer at 2 would be very severe after 1, so Black has to play there. Ishida's theory is that this gives a leisurely game. If Black 4, White plays 5 and 7, aiming next at 'a' or 'b'. I can see


Ishida's point: this would probably be troublesome for Black.



Dia. 2: Ishida's strategy



Dia. 4: thickness



Dia. 3: Otake's second thoughts

White 34 is a very ordinary jump. Anyone would feel tempted to play like this.

In this position White can't pick a fight with 35, so 36 is a commonsense move. Now we come to the main problem. In response to Black 37, doesn't White 38 desert the battle front? I would block at 1 in *Dia. 4* without thinking twice. Up to 9 White flattens out Black's position in sente, so I think this would give a leisurely game. There's a difference of one move from the figure, but in this game one wants to play thickly, taking into consideration the left side.

The shape Black makes with 39 is too good. It may be too early to prognosticate about positional judgement, but already this opening feels ominous for White.

White can't afford to delay in playing 40 now: Black A would be intolerable. White 44 is also natural.

Since White is a little behind, wanting to block at 46 is natural. The suggestion was made that White should take up position with B, but for the player actually engaged in the game this is out of the question.

Black develops rapidly with 47 to 51.

The bad-style move of 56 is unlike Otake. Up to 60 both sides make bamboo joints, but White is peeping at both sides of Black's bamboo joint, so his shape is that much more inefficient. Instead of 56 —

Dia. 5. Making centre thickness by developing with 1 and 5 is better in this position. As things stand, Black has nothing to worry about. However, sealing Black in with White 'a' will be sente, so in his own good time White could set about reducing Black's




Figure 2 (28-61)


Figure 2 (28-61). The inimitable Kobayashi style

Black 29 is an inimitable Kobayashi move. Since White would like to play there, it's also a vital point for Black, but it's very hard to discover a slow-developing move like this. I'm sure Kobayashi was proud of it.

The value of 29 is that it forces White to play 30 and 32. In its stolid way, it steals White's eye shape and refuses to let White 28 have an easy time of it.

White 34. Otake commented that he should have played at 1 in *Dia. 3*. Letting Black jump to 2 is painful, but there will be no immediate problems if White plays 3 and 5. Kobayashi said that he intended to cap at 6, but White 7 would have given a reasonable game.

left-side moyo, in which case he would have no reason to feel pessimistic.



Dia. 5: superior strategy

Black 61, aiming at C, is an ideal point. At this stage Otake clearly recognized that the game was turning nasty for him. Not only does White have no areas that will expand naturally, he also has weak groups at the right top and bottom. He has to bestir himself...





Figure 3 (62-87)



Dia. 6: Rin's suggestion

Figure 3 (62-87). Kobayashi's sole mistake


I understand White's desire to invade deeply at 62. However, Rin Kaiho, who accompanied us to Düsseldorf, offered a penetrating comment. He advocated playing patiently, capturing a stone with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6*. One can

see that if White plays so calmly, Black might become anxious. If Black 4, White moves out with 5: Black has no good way of sealing White in. That is not to say that the game turns in White's favour, but it is certain that it would at least be more drawn out.


Instead of trying to win by defending, Kobayashi counterattacks with 63 and 65: this is one of the strong points of his game. He's concluded that the game will be decided more quickly if he attacks rather than if he goes for territory. This strategy may let White invade at 66, but Black doesn't lose too much territory.

I thought that 69 and 71 were sure, steady moves, but peeping at 77 instead of 71 would probably have been severer. Even so, Black's play so far has been nearly flawless. I thought there was no chance of complications developing.

Black's game is moving along really well when he attacks at the vital point of 73 and makes a leaning attack at 75. Otake's 76 is probably a do-or-die move. If he answers at 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black 2 will hit him where it hurts. White 'a' would leave Black with the ko of Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', which would be too much of a burden. If he submits with 3, Black attacks at 4, keeping the sente moves of Black 'c' and Black 'd' in reserve. This way too White's prospects would be bleak.



Dia. 7: bleak prospects



Dia. 8: best for Black

Since White was doing badly, I could understand why he was playing do-or-die moves, but Black's manoeuvre at 77 astonished me. Cutting the opponent in two at the cost of a ponnuki like 82 is the sort of risk you take when you're behind. How should Black have played? It's not very difficult. The answer is 1 to 5 in *Dia. 8*. White has no choice but to link up with 6, so Black can help himself to profit with 7 and 9. He should easily be able to win on points. Even if White plays 6 at 'a', Black still cuts at 7 and gets a similar result.





Figure 4 (88-119)
115: connects



Dia. 9: not an upset

Figure 4 (88-119). Otake's wasted move


After this sole slip by Kobayashi, the game is up for grabs. White 88 and 90, taking away Black's base, are big. When Black plays 91, countering with his own leaning attack now works well for White. The game has been transformed.

The feature of the Kobayashi style recently has been his skill at maintaining his lead, avoiding anything reckless, once he goes ahead, but perhaps he may have been trying too hard as it was the opening game of the series.

However, Otake fluffed his chance. It would be safe to label White 96 the losing move. Black now decides the game brilliantly, brushing aside White's attempts to resist.

Dia. 9. White should force with 1 and 3, then press at 5. At the time I thought this

might upset Black's lead, but apparently things are not so simple. White 'a' will be sente, but Black also has a threat at 'b', so as far as the local area is concerned, Black won't lose the ko. If then White takes successive moves at 'c' and 'd', Black connects the ko, then applies pressure to the white group with 'e'. This would seem to give him a promising game. Instead —



Dia. 10: could go either way
5: ko; 10: ko; 12: connects

Dia. 10. Starting the ko immediately with 1 is also well worth considering. White uses 3 and Black uses 6 and 8 as ko threats. One could expect the trade to 13 to follow. This result is hard to assess. The game is quite close: you'd have to say that neither side is ahead.

The sequence that follows in the game is quite similar, with the difference that White 96 has become an outright loss. That seems to be decisive.




Figure 5 (120-160)




Figure 6 (161-200)




Figure 7 (201-249)

Figures 5, 6, 7. Endgame master

The endgame is as one would expect. But you have to give Kobayashi credit for the workmanlike way he wraps up his win. For example, note that 25 in Figure 5 is the best answer to 24. Making a sloppy answer at 29 would immediately lead to a difference of three points, making the game a half-pointer.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 52 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 34 minutes.

(Kido, March 1990)

The Kisei game was part of a large-scale go festival, with the 1990 German Go Open being

held at Essen University. This year 340 players from 24 countries participated, a great increase on last year. Most noteworthy was the contingent of 24 East German players, making their first appearance at a West German tournament. There was also a record entry of 60 players from the Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall has also meant the fall of the barriers to international go within Europe.

Game Two

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Otake Hideo

Played in Asahikawa City on 31 January, 1 February 1990.

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Kobayashi-style fuseki

White 10. If at 19, Black will make a pincer (below 21), which will work well with the top right corner.

The first move that aroused comment was White 30. Usually White takes up position on a larger scale by jumping to 'a', but Kobayashi prefers to play solidly so that he can play more aggressively elsewhere later without having to worry about this area.

White 36 becomes the key move of the opening. White's aim is to settle himself as quickly as possible inside Black's moyo, but he is unable to secure his group completely. Black can look forward to harassing the group later.






Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 1: the vital point



Dia. 2: 'professional'

Figure 2 (51-100). Otake in an attacking mood

Evaluating the result of the fight on the left side that followed Black's forcing move of 47 in Figure 1 is difficult. Most professionals following the game thought that it was painful for Black to be forced into such a low position. Kudo: 'To tell the truth, I had the same opinion, but apparently neither of the players agreed. Perhaps they thought that this result was reasonable for both sides.'

Black 69 was the sealed move.

Black 69 and 73 are a severe attack: the game now becomes really tense. White has to save this group without giving Black too much profit from his attack. Note that if Black played 69 at 77, White would atari, then jump out to 74, taking the pressure off his group. Black 73 at 74 would also be slack: White would immediately live with White 78,

Black 83 was just about the only move Otake regretted in this game. He said he should have played at 1 in *Dia. 1*; if White 2, Black plays 3. Black 1 makes it easier for Black to link up with his group below, while 3

reduces White's side territory. In contrast, White 84 to 88 make Black thin in the centre.

White 90 is another manifestation of Kobayashi's pragmatism: attacking with this diagonal move struck other players as unprofessional. The conventional approach would be to push up with 1 in *Dia. 2*; if Black were to answer at 3, White could then play 'a', having gained by making Black heavy. Presumably Kobayashi was worried that Black might lightly discard two stones with the sequence from 2.

Black 93 leads to the climax of the game. Black gouges out the bottom, but White gets two stones in place at 100 and 2 in the next figure, so the black group to the right becomes very weak. Its fate will decide the game.





Figure 3 (101-136)



Dia. 3: Black dies


Figure 3 (101–136). Otake saves his group.

Black 9. The exchange for 10 is painful: White can now kill Black as in *Dia. 3*. However, saving the black group to the right takes priority, especially as White has to drive it into his own territory in the attempt to kill it.

White 30. Linking up with 33 is worth about ten points more — but not enough to win now that White has come this far.

Black 31 may look like quite an ordinary

move, but it is decisive: it not only saves the big group here but also the black group at the bottom. White plays 32, expecting to capture the group here, but for once Kobayashi's analysis has let him down: the sequence in Dia. 3 no longer works. Not that it matters: the game is lost anyway. Even if White attacks with 1 in Dia. 4, he can't win. Black has no trouble escaping after 4, while White's bottom group has been weakened and he also has to worry about the threat of Black 'a'.



Dia. 4: Black wins

Otake realized that Kobayashi had made a misreading, so he strengthened the big group further with 35 before attending to the bottom group.

White 36. White can't play A, as letting Black link up with B would leave White more than ten points behind on the board.

It's not certain when Kobayashi woke up to his misreading, but it didn't really matter, as he couldn't vary any of his moves after 32.





Figure 4 (137-159)

Figure 4 (137-159). No ko threats

The ko is terrible for White: the game is over. Even if White defends against the oi-

otoshi with 1 in Dia. 5, however, Black lives on both sides with 2 and 4. Next, 'a' is the vital point for eye shape, but if White plays there, Black counters with 'b' through 'e', enabling him to capture White 3.



Dia. 5: hopeless for White

White has no ko threats big enough, so he can't answer 57. Successive moves at A and B would not be good enough: after Black 45 and 58, the white group to the left would be in severe danger.




Figure 5 (160-221)

ko: 100, 103, 106, 109, 112

Figure 5 (160-221). Otake's shinogi skill evens the series.

The number of moves Kobayashi played after the game had been decided perhaps indicates what a shock to him his misreading was: it took him a long time to reconcile himself to his blunder. However, this game as a whole was a triumph for Otake, though it was his ability at shinogi (rescuing stones in danger of dying) that decided the issue.

White resigns after Black 221.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 40 minutes.

Black: 6 hours 13 minutes.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri by John Power.)

The First Ing Cup

A Triumph for Cho Hun-hyun



*Cho Hun-hyun of Korea receives the winner's cup from the sponsor of the tournament, Ing Chang-ki.
Cho won the world's richest go prize ever by defeating Nie Weiping of China 3-2 in the final.*

The 1st Ing Cup, with its record prize of \$400,000, was a triumph for Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan, who for the past decade and a half has been the undisputed number one in Korea and who now has staked a strong claim to being considered the world's number one player. In the title match, he recovered from a 1-2 deficit to defeat Nie Weiping 9-dan of China, who was the top international star of the 80s.

The top professionals of the world competed in this tournament, which got off to a start in Beijing in August 1988 and took 13 months to complete. Just to recap some of the highlights, Nie beat Cho Chikun (see GW53), to meet Fujisawa Shuko in the semifinal. Shuko had beaten Ma Xiaochun and Kato (GW53), but he lost two half-pointers to Nie, both after endgame blunders (GW55). In the other block of the tournament, Cho Hun-hyun defeated Kobayashi Koichi (GW54) and Rin

Kaiho to reach the final.

The first three games of the title match, played in China in April and May last year, were given in GW56. In this issue, we would like to present the final two games.

Game Four

White: Nie Weiping 9-dan (China)

Black: Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan (Korea)

Komi: 7 1/2; time: 3 hours each.

Played in Singapore on 2 September 1989.

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-39). *Keeping things simple*

The 9-11 pattern has been popular recently. After 13, White decides to keep things simple with 14, but if Black plays this joseki he has to know how to handle the cut at 1 in *Dia. 1*.






Figure 1 (1-39)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 1. Black ataris at 2, discarding the two stones. However, fattening the sacrifice with another stone at 4 is the standard procedure. This way Black is left with the possibility of fighting a ko with 6 to 12.

This pattern recently occurred in a game between Rin and Sonoda Yuichi, and Rin played 13 in *Dia. 2* instead of taking the ko with 'a'; after 16, he then switched to 17. However, the general feeling among other professionals was that this result was good for Black. White could avoid the ko by playing the marked stone at 'b', in which case he captures the three black stones unconditionally, but then Black attaches (where the marked stone is) and gets an effective squeeze. That would be painful for White.

Black 25. Presumably Cho makes the narrow extension (instead of A) because he dislikes the prospect of White's pressing down on him at B.

When White responds to Black 29 by invading at 30, Black is able to force him to hane and connect in the corner. The result is quite satisfactory for Black. Of course, one might feel that 25 is now too close to Black's own

thickness, but Black can't have everything his own way.

Black 39 is an excellent move: it makes 57 in Figure 2 sente.





Figure 2 (40-61)



Dia. 3: a severe attack


Figure 2 (40-61). White goes ahead in territory.

With 47 Black goes for thickness. Chen Zude 9-dan of China commented that Black could have made the severe attack in *Dia. 3*. The aim is to contrive a double attack on this group and the two white stones to the left.

White has taken all four corners and has a big lead in territory, so Black has to do something. When he plays 53 and 55, his aim becomes clear: he hopes to secure a large centre territory. However, before playing 55, Black should have forced with 57, as then White would have had to answer immediately at 60. Once White has 56 on the board, he is able to counter with his own forcing move at 58. Without 56 present, Black would be able to answer 58 by playing a forcing move at A, which would help him in the centre.

Black 59. Having to connect here is painful, but if Black jumped into the corner —

Dia. 4. The sequence to 18 would probably follow. Both sides live, but after White strengthens himself with 16 and 18, Black can't hope to block him off from the centre, so this contradicts his centre strategy.



Dia. 4: inconsistent




Figure 3 (62-100)

Figure 3 (62-100). The game becomes close.

White 64 is perhaps too cautious. White could have tried going for profit at the bottom with White 72, defying Black to attack his group at the top. It would be in no real danger of dying. After Black invades at 69, White is forced into a painfully low position up to 78.

Nie chooses to reduce the centre peacefully with 80 to 88: positional judgment is one of his strong points, so he must have calculated that this was good enough. Chinese players following the game maintained that White had an easy win after 88, but in fact the game was now very close. Closing off the centre with 85 and 89 guarantees a large centre territory and puts Black well in the game.




Figure 4 (101-150)
8, 11: ko


Figure 4 (101-150). White misses a chance.

Black 11. Cho commented that he should have answered at 13 instead of taking the ko. White certainly gains from playing the satisfying forcing sequence from 12 to 18.

White 40. This was White's chance to hane at A on the right side. If he had played the sente continuation of Black B, White C, Black D, he might have won.

White 46 is a surprising move. One would naturally expect White to connect in answer to Black 45; White is aiming next at 50, but he probably loses about a point here. Of course, even if he does play 46 at 47, Black has the endgame sequence of E, White F, Black G.

Even so, White 46 is a plucky move. After capturing at 49, Black can put the corner into ko with H, White I, Black J.



Dia. 5: falling into a trap

Figure 5 (151-176). A small lead

Black 51. If Black intercepts with 1 in *Dia. 5*, he collapses after White 2 to 6.




Figure 5 (151-176)

Black 53. Playing the forcing moves to 57 before connecting at 59 shows good timing. If Black omits 59, White will jump in at A.

At this stage, most of the players in the pressroom thought that White was leading, but actually the game was very close. If anything, Black was a shade ahead. Nie seemed to feel this way, for around here he was using a lot of time.

Black 71. If at 72, White gets a one-sided ko with White 71, Black B, White C.

White 76. If at D, Black will switch to an atari at 76. That means that White has no choice but to drop back at 76, which is painful (he can't block below 75, letting Black start a ko by cutting at 76).




Figure 6 (177-200)

Figure 6 (177-200). Black's lead becomes apparent.

Black 83. Connecting at 92 is bigger.

About this stage some of the Chinese players were beginning to have doubts about Nie's 'lead'.




Figure 7 (201-250)




Figure 8 (251-318)

ko (over 8): 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50; 55: connects (left of 53); 66: below 58; ko: 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88, 91, 96; 97: connects (at 70); 99: at 93; 102: connects ko; 104: connects (at 93)

Figure 7 (201-250), Figure 8 (251-318)

After the game Cho commented that White 46 in Figure 4 was the losing move, but with the final result so close both sides probably

played a number of moves that could have turned out to be 'losing moves'.

In the endgame White was the one who sought complications, so Nie must have known he was behind, but Cho was able to clamp down and steer the game safely to a win. This success gave Cho the momentum he needed.

Note that the dame moves are all included in the figure, as the Ing rules count all points occupied as territory.

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

(Kido, November 1989)

Game Five

White: Nie Weiping

Black: Cho Hun-hyun

Played in Singapore on 5 September 1989.

Commentary by Cho Hun-hyun.

Nie had white again in this game because he won the nigiri. One of Ing's aims in sponsoring this tournament was to popularize his rules, including his komi of 7 1/2, but as far as the komi goes, he was unable to convince the players, most of whom elected to take white when they won the nigiri. Even so, the players with black did quite well, winning 12 of the 21 games played. This winning percentage, 57.1%, compares favourably with the usual winning percentage in Japanese professional go for black of between 53% and 54%, though of course 21 games is too small a sample to mean anything. The feeling among Japanese players was that Cho's winning two games in a row with black while giving a komi of 7 1/2 points was quite an achievement.

When Cho arrived at the playing room for the fourth game, he had been tense and unsmiling, an indication of the immense pressure he was under as the embodiment of the hopes of five million Korean go fans, not to mention the general Korean public, which was also following the match. On top of that, both he and Nie had been suffering from bad colds. On the morning of the fifth game, however, he was relaxed and cheerful, whereas Nie was the one who looked a little out of sorts. He had been unable to shake off his cold, though whether that affected his play is another question.




Figure 1 (1-34)

Figure 1 (1-34). *Imitating Kobayashi*

In contrast to Game 4, this time Nie goes for thickness and Cho for territory. The narrow extension of 17 is a move invented by Kobayashi Koichi, and in fact the fuseki to 29 is the same as the game between Kobayashi and Takemiya in the 1st Fujitsu Cup (see GW53, page 14). Kobayashi first played the extension to 17 against Kato in the Kisei title match earlier in 1988 (the move is analysed on page 35 of GW53). In an interview later in the year Kobayashi mentioned how happy he was to have this fuseki imitated, not least because it resolved his own doubts about whether the pattern was really good.

Nie was the first to diverge from the Fujitsu game. Instead of 30, Takemiya had extended at 31. Shuko commented that while he couldn't say which move was better, he would have played the same way as Nie, following the principle of stopping enemy groups from linking up.

Figure 2 (35-51). *Aerial fight*

Cho regretted 35 a little, the reason being that after expanding the centre with 36 and 38, White got a good move at 40. Perhaps, then, Black should have played the high move of A instead of 35; in that case, White would invade at 46, leading to a completely different game.

Black 47. White B later is a good move, so Black should exchange B for White C before playing 47. When Black reinforces the centre

with 47, the presence of the B-C exchange becomes all the more desirable.




Figure 2 (35-51)





Figure 3 (52-73)

Figure 3 (52-73). Sparkling play by Black

White 54. Since Black has tenukied after 49 and 51, fighting spirit calls for White to capture a stone as in *Dia. 1*. Black is satisfied when he gets to connect at 55. However, 54 is not a major slip.


More dubious is White 60. This is bad style: helping Black to extend at 61 makes him thick and gives him extremely good shape. Just looking at the local position, the validity of this comment may be hard to credit, but later it becomes more apparent. The question is how Black's thickness with 61 affects the whole board.



Dia. 1: fighting spirit

Black plunges in with 63. When White prevents him from linking up on the side with 64, he plays the sabaki tesuji of 65. White is forced to pull back at 66 because of Black's thickness at 61. It is also thanks to the effectiveness of 61 that Black is able to ignore 70 and peep at 71. He then switches to the large move of 73. Cho's assessment now was that he was ahead.

Well, then, how should White have played with 60?




Dia. 2: better for White

Dia. 2. Turning at 1 is good style. Permitting White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 2 next would make White incredibly thick in the centre, besides flattening out Black's position and creating various white sente moves for later. That means that Black has no choice but to counter with 2. White plays 3 and 5 in sente, then switches to 7 and 9, thus covering the threat of White 'c'. Next, he can take his time in attacking the large black group. Playing this way would take best advantage of White's thickness all over the board and give a close game.

Although White does take the good point of 62, Black wipes out his left-side territory in sente, then switches to the superb point of 73.

Note that connecting at 1 in *Dia. 3* (next page) instead of 73 is out of the question. The addition of the marked white stone makes White 2 and 4 very severe. Usually this ko is unreasonable, but in this game White has an

overwhelming lead in ko threats, so he can throw his weight around. (If at any time Black plays 'a', White cuts at 'b'.)



Dia. 3: a serious threat

On top of this, there is a very strong possibility that the white stone marked with a square will be sente. If so, White can gouge out Black's corner with 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'. In short, Black's position is very thin.

Black 73 eliminates all these threats and it is also big in itself.




Figure 4 (74-115)

Figure 4 (74-115). Full of danger

The way the game is developing, it looks as if White's attack on the centre and left-side black group is going to fizzle out. That is in itself proof of how skilfully Cho has played. Black 93 nullifies White's thickness: on the face of it, it might seem to be decisive. However, new complications ensue.


With 93 Black misses his chance to play 1 in *Dia. 4* in sente first. If White ignores him, Black cuts him into two with Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c', so White can't omit a reinforcement



Ing Chang-ki was more than satisfied with the success of his tournament and the publicity it generated. Perhaps his only regret was that it proved impossible to stage the semifinals in Taiwan as he had wanted. Nie Weiping is a ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party, so there was no way that the Taipei government was going to issue him with a visa. However, Taiwanese and Korean players made history by being the first competitors from their countries in any sport to visit China when they went to Beijing for the opening rounds, so the tournament has made a big contribution to international friendship.

Ing is not one to rest on his laurels. He continues to sponsor the World Youth Wei-ch'i Championship, the first tournament he founded, and last year he created a new tournament for top amateurs from Japan, China, and Taiwan. Latest word is that he is sponsoring an invitational tournament for top European players at the next European Go Congress. The first prize is \$10,000, which probably makes it the richest go tournament held so far outside the Orient. As far as go players are concerned, a business fortune has never been put to better use.

at 2. Jumping to 3 would then set Black on course for a win.




Dia. 4: the easy way to win

The attempt to force with 99 is risky; if Black were to lose the game, this would be the move responsible. Instead, Black should defend at A or 105, rendering White's cut with 104 ineffective. That way Black would be ahead, as Cho lamented after the game.

The combination of 104 and 106-108 is very severe. Nie shows his strength in seizing this

opportunity. However, capturing with 109 to 115 does relieve the pressure on Black. The game is now closer, but Black is still ahead. Rin Kaiho pointed out that White should have used 112 to follow *Dia. 5*. In this variation, intercepting with 5 throws the game into confusion. Nie's play seems to lack some of his former sharpness.







Figure 5 (116-145)



Dia. 6: better

Dia. 7: a trap

Figure 5 (116-145). Cho wraps the game up.

White 16 is the losing move. When Black forces with 17, then reinforces with 19, this group can no longer be harassed. If White had followed *Dia. 6*, competing in territory, the game would not have been over. After 9, Black is a little ahead, but at least the game is still close. Alternatively, it might be possible to contrive a double attack by playing 5 at 6.

The attack of 20 comes too late: it lacks forcefulness once Black has strengthened the group with 17 and 19. Black also has no trouble looking after his top-right group with 21 and 23.

White attacks desperately with 24 on, but Black 35 is decisive. The continuation to 45 is forced: White is captured because of his shortage of liberties.

Note that if Black plays 45 at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White stuns him with the tesuji of 2. If Black 'a', White counters with 4, Black 'b', White 6.

However, Black 3 doesn't work either.

Apparently Nie resigned himself to failure when he saw Black 35. If he links up with 44 at A, Black plays B, securing centre territory and a runaway win.

When his five stones are captured with 45, Nie has to throw in the towel.

White resigns after Black 145.

(Kido, Nov.1989. Translated by John Power.)



The fight is over: the loser congratulates the victor at the Awards Ceremony. Apparently Nie gave a very humorous speech in Chinese, for he had the audience exploding in laughter time after time, but unfortunately the Kido reporter doesn't understand Chinese, so we are unable to report what he said.

When Cho returned home to Seoul, he was greeted as a national hero, with a triumphal parade from the airport into the centre of town, and, later on, a decoration from the government. If a Japanese had won the tournament, there might have been a small report at the bottom of the front page of the Japanese newspapers, but in Korea it was headline news. This was quite a contrast for Cho with the cold reception he received when he lost in the first round of the 1st Fujitsu Cup in 1988. On that occasion, Cho reported, he 'didn't know where to hide'. The Korean public is very demanding of its heroes, but it is fortunate in having a player like Cho who can live up to its expectations.

Just for the record, Nie took home \$100,000 as his second prize, a sum equivalent to 200 years of the average income in China. In Cho's case, the first prize was three times his usual annual income. These prizes should tide them both over until the second Ing Cup (the tournament is held every four years).

The 14th Meijin Title

Kobayashi's First Successful Defence



In addition to being chosen by *Kido* as the outstanding player of the year for 1989, Kobayashi Koichi was also honoured with the award, also for the second successive year, of the 27th Shusai Prize. Kobayashi also won this prize in 1985, so he is gaining ground on rivals like Rin Kaiho and Kato, who have both won it five times, and Cho Chikun, who has earned the honour four times.

The two major factors that weighed with the Shusai Prize judges were undoubtedly Kobayashi's successful defences of the Kisei and Meijin titles in 1989. The Kisei is the number one title, by virtue of its larger prize money, but Kobayashi was probably just as happy on defending the Meijin title, as he has experienced more frustration in it, losing it immediately to Kato after he won it for the first time in 1985. Also, since the Kisei is a new title, for most of his early career winning the Meijin title would have seemed the highest ambition a go player could strive for.

In our previous issue we described the pragmatic side of Kobayashi's go, for example, his willingness to play crude-looking moves if they are actually the most effective in a certain position, his readiness to erase aji when he's ahead if that will simplify the game. However, against Awaji Kobayashi found his usual style irrelevant. As challenger, Awaji believed that his only chance lay in taking the fight to the

champion, so to match his pugnacity Kobayashi had to revert to the more aggressive fighting style of his younger days. When the chips were down, Awaji found that Kobayashi knew a thing or two about all-in fighting.

The first two games of the title match were given in GW58. We resume our coverage with the series tied 1-1.

Game Three: An Alarming Fightback

This was another aggressive game marked by large-scale fighting. Like the first game of the series, Kobayashi took an early lead, only to see 'Rocky' Awaji fight his way back into contention. This commentary takes the form of an interview with Kato Masao, conducted while the game was in progress, by the freelance go journalist Akiyama Kenji.

White: Awaji Shuzo 9-dan

Black: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei, Meijin & Gosei
Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each.

Played in Gifu City on 4, 5 October 1989.

Commentary by Kato Masao Oza.

Kato: Games between these two always get rough early on.

Akiyama Kenji: Most people didn't think much of the challenger's chances, so the series suddenly became very interesting when he won the first game. What's more, Awaji's kind of game is very popular with amateurs.

Kato: It's interesting for professionals too. You don't know where the next punch is going to come flying from. It's no longer the age of 'the killer' [Kato's old nickname] — it's the age of Rocky. Kobayashi is a really powerful player, but it can't be fun for him to face Awaji. You think you've knocked him out, but he's on his feet again, throwing a barrage of punches.

Figure 1 (1-39). *In a hurry to start fighting*

AK: It seems to be a rule with Kobayashi to play 1 and 3 with black. Awaji seems to be the

type of player who changes his fuseki each game. The double 3-3 may be a little unusual. Black 11 and 13 feel like the Kobayashi style to me.

Kato: This is a solid way of developing. He's taken into account the fact that White has no suitable extension from the 3-3 stone in the top left corner. For example, if White plays 14 at A, Black will play at 14, giving him extensions on both wings from his corner enclosure. When White plays 14, Black 15 is just right.





Figure 1 (1-39)



Dia. 1: conventional but not to Awaji's liking

AK: In other words, Black 13 makes miai of the shoulder hit at 15 and extending at 14. When the opponent hits you at the shoulder, amateurs never know which side to crawl on.

Kato: It's not easy. Perhaps White could also crawl at B. The continuation would be

Black A, White C, Black D — this is not out of the question.

AK: Black 19 astonished me. It's the first time I've seen this kind of move.

Kato: It's an ingenious move. If Black blocks at 22, he gets a heavy shape after White attacks him at E. I think 19 is a good move. I have my doubts about Awaji's 20. It feels painful: he's playing too low. Though if you asked me where White should play, I couldn't answer.

AK: Black seems in fine fettle from 25 to 29. However, White builds thickness with 30 and 32, so we seem to be in for a leisurely game.

Kato: No, the position will immediately get treacherous. There'll be a mountain of frightening variations involving living and dying. Be prepared! The third game, after one win each, is where you want the opponent to feel your power. If one side shows signs of not being up to the pressure, not only this game but also the series will be over. Neither can compromise: each must fight to the bitter end.

The large knight's move of 33 impressed me. This is an inimitable Kobayashi move. It's a sign of his strength that he can come up with moves like this.

AK: Even I can see what he's aiming at: the contact play at 35.

Kato: This is severe. So a player with a conventional approach to the game would have been tempted to defend against this by jumping down to the edge with 1 in Dia. 1.

AK: This makes Black's corner thin.

Kato: Black would reinforce with the makeshift of 2, then expand the top with 4 and 6. This is perhaps what Awaji wanted to avoid. Or Black might use 4 to cap at 5. Even so, I think this is more appropriate than what happens in the game.


AK: Perhaps Awaji doesn't have the conventional feel for the game. I know. He's challenging Kobayashi Meijin, defying him to attack.

Kato: That might be it. He spent a lot of time thinking about 36 and 38, though there's no other way to play. If he didn't already have his counter worked out, it doesn't make sense.

AK: Black 39 was the first move of the afternoon's play. The moment he saw this move, Awaji muttered: 'Have I collapsed so soon?' Was he shamming? Or does one say

these things unconsciously?

Kato: It's unconscious. You have no memory later of what you mutter during a game. I think Black could also have extended at 1 in *Dia. 2*. If White 2, Black attaches at 3; if White 4, White can capture two stones up to 8, but the ponnuki should satisfy Black. That said, Black 39 is severe. He tries to capture the white stones straight off. The players will spend a lot of time on their moves here. One misstep and you'll be crushed immediately.



Dia. 2: alternative

Dia. 3: better timing




Figure 2 (40-63)

61: connects


Figure 2 (40-63). Not the way Kobayashi planned it

Kato: The attack up to 49 is severe. How is White going to save his group? He pushed down at 50? That's strange. Black can attach at

51. Ah, I see — White should have played 50 earlier, at around 44, for example. At that stage Black would have had to answer at 62, so White would be able to play 1 in *Dia. 3* in sente, enabling him to live next with 3. White's timing with 50 is way out.

AK: I'd like to hear what Awaji has to say later.

Kato: Cutting at 52 is the only thing Awaji can do. Black's answer at 53 is aggressive. Countering with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* would be good enough, I think. No, maybe I'm wrong. White extricates himself with 4 to 10, making Black thin in the centre. White can also push through in the corner, so this variation might let Black in for a hard time.



Dia. 4: Black is thin

Dia. 5: White collapses

AK: White is walking on a tightrope with 54.

Kato: This seems to be the only way to play. If he blocks at 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black easily finishes him off with 2 and 4.

AK: Descending at 5 is no good because of Black 6 and 8. But Kobayashi's taking a long time over his answer.

Kato: Perhaps he overlooked White 54. There's no alternative to making a trade with 55 to 62. I can't believe that the sequence up to here is the way Kobayashi planned it. Or perhaps he's spending his time calculating the profit-loss balance of the trade and assessing the overall territorial balance.

AK: They did play the trade to 62 you predicted. Black spent one hour 11 minutes on 55. Which side has profited? Swallowing up Black's corner enclosure whole is fantastic, but

Black has a big territorial moyo.

Kato: The question is how much territory Black will realize from this moyo and what will happen if White makes a 3-3 invasion in the top right corner. [The above analysis was carried out on 4 October.]





Figure 3 (64-83)



Dia. 6: safe but interesting

Figure 3 (64-83). A question of life and death

AK: The game finished just a little while ago, and the players have finished reviewing it. Shall we finish the job while our impressions are still fresh?

Kato: It was an incredible game. If they always played this kind of go, their bodies would give out.

AK: Awaji said that he forgot to push through in the bottom right [i.e. to play 50 in Figure 2 at an earlier stage]. He said that from that point on he was in trouble. He plunged in with 64 and 66, staking the game on whether he lived or died.


Kato: If he doesn't pull off something here, he'll fall short in territory. If he lives, there's no problem. Even getting a ko would be a success.

AK: White spent nearly two hours thinking about 72.


Kato: Once White peeps here, there's no pulling back. Taking a lot of time on the move is natural. I was expecting something like White 1 in Dia. 6. The sequence to 7 might follow. This just whittles off a bit of black territory and is not a very appealing variation, but that couldn't be helped, I thought.

AK: What if Black hanes at 6 instead of 2?

Kato: White crosscuts at 2 and should be able to settle his group. Awaji's intention with 72 to 80 was to make all his stones live. I don't know whether to praise his courage or criticize his recklessness.



Dia 7: Kato's innocent suggestion



Dia. 8: the 'trap'

AK: Your exchange with Kobayashi over 81 was interesting. Kobayashi said he should have pressed at 1 in Dia. 7. You countered that in that case White could live (with a ko) with the empty triangle of 2.

Kato: Right. I thought that White could live thanks to the sente move of 4. Kobayashi pounced on me — it was as if I'd fallen into a trap. Instead of 5 here, he'd descend at 1 in Dia. 8. This move not only reduces White to one eye in gote in the corner, it also sets up two eyes on the edge for Black if White cuts at 2. As is obvious now, White can't live in this variation, so the game might have been decided there and then.



AK: That's a really frightening move he read out. It shows how deeply he reads. Awaji had a narrow escape.

Figure 4 (84–109). The Meijin's brilliant positional judgement

AK: I'd like to clarify the life-and-death problem here. The question is: can White live if he plays 84 at 1 in *Dia. 9*? Black 2 is the only move for attacking his eye shape, so if White 3 is sente, White will live.





Figure 4 (84–109)
96: ko; 105: ko; 108: ko



Dia. 9: White dies

Kato: That's right, but Kobayashi will counter with his brilliancy at 4. If White 5 and 7, Black can cut at 8. White 11 is necessary, so Black lives with 12. White is now unable to get two eyes. Cutting with 13 and 15 doesn't offer any hope.

AK: Awaji must have realized that this variation was risky. Instead, he sought to make an eye with 84 and 86.

Kato: Even though he missed the best

move, the forcefulness of Kobayashi's play is impressive. He could have compromised if he'd wanted to, yet he attacks unrelentingly from the outside. You can't play like this unless you're in good form.

AK: Perhaps he was trying to make his opponent admit he'd been outplayed, to get him to throw in the towel early and recognize that Kobayashi was reading better. But Awaji never gives up. White's shape with 88 is ambiguous: it looks as if there might be an eye, but it also looks eyeless.


Kato: Pushing through at 89 is the only move, after which cutting at 94 is White's only hope. The move that really impressed me the most is the atari of 95.

AK: I don't understand what's so fantastic about it.

Kato: He could have captured the white group if he'd wanted to. But he purposely refrained from doing so. Wouldn't you be tempted to fill in a liberty with 95 at 1 in *Dia. 10*?

AK: What's the trick? If Black ataris at 7 after 4 and 6?

Kato: That's it. Next, White will pull out the tail end of his group with 8 and 10. This trade was the only result I expected. After all, the cash profit on the top right looks impressive.



Dia. 10: cash in the bank

AK: Having come this far without compromising, most people would think that it was time to cash in their earnings and take it easy.

Kato: But he's aiming at something dif-

ferent.


AK: Something different? Ah, the three white stones at the centre top?

Kato: Right. White is able to live with 102 and 104, because Black left open the liberty at A, but Black builds thickness with 103, making his attack at 109 all the severer.

AK: I feel as if I've been tricked. We were discussing a life-and-death problem. I was convinced that the result would be good for Black if White died and good for White if he lived.

Kato: It's not so simple. Black gets a good result even if he lets White live. So the question arises of whether White couldn't have tried a little harder. Let's say White extends at 1 in *Dia. 11* instead of 100. Connecting at 2 is the only answer, so White attacks vigorously with 3 on.

AK: This is the variation they looked at after the game. After White 11 and 13, Black 14 is necessary. Up to 19 White links up, so a semeai (capturing race) follows.



Dia. 11: better for White?

Kato: The ko at 'a' will be fought to the bitter end. The conclusion was that White could fight the ko, as he has ko threats starting with 'b'. If he lost the ko after squeezing on the outside, then successive moves at 'c' and 'd' would give him enough compensation.

AK: It gives me a headache just to look at this variation.

Kato: It makes my head hurt too. Well, let's just gloss over the problem and say that extending at 1 may have been possible. Counterattacking with Black 12 at 'e' looks

possible, so there's no knowing how it would all end up.




Figure 5 (110-184)
50: connects

Figure 5 (110-184). The game turns into a brawl.


AK: Is Kobayashi in earnest about trying to capture this group?

Kato: Probably. Black 19 and 23 couldn't be more severe. Around 24 things are getting really tough for Awaji. It's depressing to be subjected to a one-sided attack, so he prevents Black from linking up on the top edge, warning him that if he's not careful White will counterattack, but the exchange for 25 stops him from getting even one eye. The black group on the left is full of eye shape, so this is hardly the time or the place for White to think about counterattacking.

AK: Black 35 is a textbook example of a leaning attack. The position suddenly becomes very painful for White. I guess he's on the ropes.

Kato: No, he's not out of it yet. White 38 and 40 show that he's still full of fight. He's certainly under heavy pressure, though. Not only does he have to save his group, he also has to make sure his bottom-left position isn't damaged badly.

AK: Let's restrict ourselves to the problem of the bottom left. If the black group here lives, then naturally the white group above perishes. I can understand this, but as for the meaning of White 76... If he pulls back at 1 in *Dia. 12*?




Dia. 12

Kato: Black easily lives with 2. Throwing in a cut at 3 is the vital point, but it leads to nothing after 4. The moment Black lives it's all over. Assuming White exchanges 'a' for Black 'b', then if White 1 were at 'c', he could take away Black's eye shape with White 'd'. So attacking with 76 is natural and inevitable.


AK: Kobayashi said that he made a mistake after this.

Kato: Instead of 81 he could have connected at 1 in Dia. 13. Because he lives with 3 if White plays 2. If White 4 and 6, Black has the clever tesuji of 7 and 9.

AK: White can't atari! If White uses 10 to capture at 'a', Black 'b' is sente, so he's alive.



Dia. 13



AK: Poor Awaji. How unlucky to be missing that extra ko threat.

Kato: Is 'unlucky' the right word? It just couldn't be helped. If Kobayashi hadn't made a mistake, the game would have been over long ago. It's impressive that Awaji held out this long.




Figure 7 (206-270)

69: connects (at 24)

White wins and connects the ko.

Figure 7 (206-270). Like playing two games

Kato: There seem to be no problems with the endgame. This game was one fight after another, so actually there was no real endgame left to play.

AK: Awaji said, 'I wanted to be put out of my misery earlier.' But maybe we shouldn't believe him. On the other hand, Kobayashi said: 'It was excruciating the way the game just went on and on without ending.' He was probably being sincere.

Kato: It's hard to say when the game's just finished, but I have a feeling this was a classic game. It's quite a while since I've seen such a fantastic game. We should be grateful to the players.

AK: Well, we're grateful to you for putting in two days on this commentary.

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 58 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 51 minutes.

(Igo Club, December 1989)

After the game Kobayashi commented: 'I'm exhausted. I feel as if I've played two games.' His reaction was understandable. If the fight from 34 in Figure 1 to 104 in Figure 4 was one game, then the fight from 109 on was another. Although he could afford to compromise in the first fight, Kobayashi had to go all out in the second to contain Awaji's aggression, but in the process he showed that he's able to handle himself in an all-in brawl. With the way the series was going, fans were looking forward to another spectacular clash in the fourth game and they were not disappointed.

Game Four

White: Kobayashi Koichi


Black: Awaji Shuzo

Played on 18, 19 October 1989 in Nagaragawa, Gifu Prefecture.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.

Each of the four games played so far has been marked by furious fighting. This is probably due to the style of the challenger. Looking back on the four games, when Awaji has black, he bases his game completely on attack, and when he has white completely on shinogi [rescuing weak groups]. It's one of these two extremes, attack or shinogi — there's no happy medium. This is not a question of playing a territorial or a non-territorial game — he's not happy unless the stones are coming to grips with each other. That reminds me: the late Takagawa once described Awaji's game as 'bird lime go'.

Kobayashi Meijin doesn't dislike infighting either. The only thing is that he doesn't base his game completely on fisticuffs — he sometimes uses his feet and keeps his distance from the opponent. I think you could say that at the moment his skill in using all of the ring is enabling him to dominate his opponent.



Dia. 1: good for Black

Figure 1 (1–40). A tricky fuseki

Right from the start Awaji takes up an aggressive stance with 1 and 3. If White plays 4 at 5, Black will try to score points with the taisha; when he chooses 4 instead, Black's plan is to use 5 as the linchpin of a moyo at the top.

White 6. If at 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black will build a splendid moyo with 2 to 8.




Figure 1 (1–40)

Black 7. It's hard to play Black A–White B because of the shape Black gets.

White 16. I think that answering at 18 is the natural move. Black would set up a moyo with Black 16, forestalling which was the aim of 16. In the game, White 16 is cramped for space after Black caps at 19.

White 20. If at C, then Black will exchange 21 for 22 then cap at D, after which it would not be easy for White to settle himself.


White 24. White 35 is also feasible, but perhaps White doesn't like the prospect of a black invasion at E.

White 24 and 28 lose points by helping Black to strengthen himself, but this can't be helped. Even so, the white group is not definitely settled after 32: White's position is still shaky.

Black 35 is severe. White could link up by playing 36 at 1 in *Dia. 2*, but then his whole group would come under attack after Black 6.

Black is satisfied when he cuts off a stone with 37 and 39. White had to find a more ingenious way of settling this group than 20. If there is no better way, then one has to con-

clude that White 16 was a little dubious.



Dia. 2: risky

Dia. 3: what White wants




Figure 2 (41–54)

Figure 2 (41–54). A success for Black

Black 41 probably caused Kobayashi Meijin a lot of agonizing. If Black plays at 1 in *Dia. 3* first, then White will be tempted to fight back with 2; if then Black 3, White strikes at the vital point of 4, a move which not only aims at wedging in at 'a' but also at sente moves at 'b' and 'c'. This way Black would be the one to have trouble working out how to answer. However, when Black plays 41 first, White has to defend in the corner and it's not easy to choose between White A and 42–44. White A would build more strength to use against Black on the outside, but with the weak group below to look after, White can't muster the

courage to play there.

In the end, White plays 42 and 44, then links up with 46, but Black captures the outside stones up to 53. I think that Black has scored a success here.

White 54. White B is also a good point, but then Black C would turn the stones to the left into a floating group. White 54 makes it harder for Black to play C.





Figure 3 (55-74)




Dia. 4: helping Black to complete his moyo

Figure 3 (55-74). Black has no reason to be dissatisfied.

I completely approve of the shoulder hit at 55. If White answers with the standard sequence in Dia. 4, Black will have a good chance of turning his moyo into territory as it stands. (Black 6 at 7 is also possible.) That

would give him 90 points, so White couldn't win.

I don't like White 62 and 64. In particular, the exchange of 64 for 65 settles the shape and makes it hard for White to get sabaki. Rather than 62, isn't White 1 in Dia. 5, which aims at the contact plays at 'a' and 'b', the correct move here? Or White could also consider playing 1 at 'c'.



Dia. 5: better style

Dia. 6: not possible

White 66 is painful. Ordinarily White would want to connect at 1 in Dia. 6, but in this case he can't get two eyes after the shoulder hit of 2. Capturing with 67 and 69 must have felt good.

White 70. As far as shape goes, White would prefer to extend at A, but with 55 lying in wait that doesn't help him.

Black 71 and 73 are also severe. With 74, White is bluffing that his group is settled — actually its status is still ambiguous.





Figure 5 (75-100)

Figure 5 (75-100). A pessimist v. an optimist

Black 75 is a major error in strategy. The meaning of this move is to invite White to push along with 76, so that Black can get

stones in place at 77, 79, and 81, in preparation for an attempt to capture the white group at the top, but this is accompanied by too much danger. In this position there's no reason why Black has to force the issue immediately. I would play at 1 in *Dia. 7*. If White 2, the idea is to play 3 and 5 and threaten White from a distance. Assuming White reinforces at 6, Black could jump out at 7. Surely this is a comfortable development for him.



Dia. 7: the leisurely approach

Black 83 may be a vital point for attack, but even so one's instinctive feeling is that there's no chance of capturing this white group.

Why was Awaji so impatient? My guess is that he's a pessimist and Kobayashi's an optimist. Since his opponent was playing with such self-confidence, Awaji probably became convinced he had to try to capture the group.

Black may be attacking White, but it is really White who has the initiative here. He knows that he just has to survive this attack to win.

White 100. Kobayashi: 'I get an eye if I turn to the right of 86, but I was convinced I had to invade here.'

Figure 5 (101–130). *The tables are turned.*

Black's peep at 1 enables him to save the four stones on the side with 3 and 5, but getting a stone in place at 4 makes it easier for White to secure his group. Instead of 3, playing at 1 in *Dia. 8* may be better style, but even this way White has no trouble saving his group with 2 to 8. White 'b', aiming at 'a', is sente, and depending on circumstances pushing through with White 'c' might be possible.

In any case, by the time Awaji ataried the stone with 5, he had probably given up hope of capturing the group.

The tesuji of 6 helps White to build up momentum and by the time he pushes down with 22, the defender has turned the tables on the attacker.





Figure 5 (101–130)



Dia. 8: better style?



Awaji — disappointed with his attack




Figure 6 (131-164)





Figure 7 (165-200)



Dia. 9: survival uncertain
Figure 6 (131-164). Kobayashi makes sure of his win.

White now takes control of the game, rocking Black with the strong move of 32.

Black 35. If Black connects at 1 in *Dia. 9*, White attacks at 2. Black's prospects of saving the group are not clear.

White 46 and 48 are also clever moves; White's sente capture with 54 and 56 must have felt good.

The aim of 58 and 60 is to make 62 sente: playing this way shows that White has already confirmed for himself the fact that he has a win. If White doesn't play these moves, dipping down to the edge with Black A is not only big, it also creates the aji of a hane at B and further conjures up the ominous threat of a 3-3 invasion at C.

Just for reference, note that if White wanted to play the biggest endgame sequence, he would make the gote placement at 1 in *Dia. 10*.




Figure 8 (201-273)

ko (over 14): 17, 20, 23, 36, 39;

41: connects (at 14)

Figures 7, 8. A convincing 2 1/2 points

The endgame is not so difficult, so White's winning margin actually gives the impression of a big win.

Awaji is saying himself that the fuseki is not going well for him, but making a desperate fightback in a slightly unfavourable position might actually suit his temperament better. In both the second and fourth games, his attempts to wind up favourable games backfired. He is giving ample demonstration of his individual style, but it's not leading to favourable results.

White wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Kido, December 1989)

Game 5: The First Territorial Contest

White: Awaji Shuzo

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Tokyo on 1, 2 November 1989.

Commentary by Kobayashi (interviewed by Hotta Gobanshi).




Figure 1 (1-45)

Figure 1 (1-45). White expands the wrong way.

Kobayashi: 'In the first four games, Awaji tried various different experiments in the fuseki, so I was surprised when he played the most conventional opening in this game. Up to 10 White gets an adequate position at the bottom, but extending to 11 enables Black to nullify White's influence at the top.'

Black 13. If the high move in *Dia. 1*, then after Black 5 White will set down roots on the right side with 6 and 8.


White 18, preventing Black from taking up position here, is natural. As Black answers at 19, White considers 18 a forcing move.

When Black invades at 21, choosing which side to block on is perplexing. Kobayashi: 'I would prefer to block at 1 in *Dia. 2*. Up to 11 White takes profit; it would now be very difficult for Black to decide on his next move.'


After Black links up with the moves to 37, the threat of a white contact play at A has been eliminated, which is a major gain.

White 38. Kobayashi: 'This probably should be at 1 in *Dia. 3*. White's moyo becomes a deep valley. This would make for a close game. Black's next move would be very difficult.'


When White plays 38, Black makes a deep invasion at 39. Apparently this move took Awaji by surprise.




Dia. 1: White gets a base



Dia. 2: better for White?




Dia. 3: a deep moyo



Dia. 4: good for Black

White 40. If at 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black makes good shape with 2 to 6, so he would be satisfied.

White 42. *Dia. 4* was not out of the question for 40, but once he has invested the stone in the centre answering underneath with 42 is out of the question. Black would secure a comfortable position with 2 to 8 in *Dia. 5* (next page) and his path out into the centre on the right would still be open.



Dia. 5: inconsistent





Figure 2 (46-65)




Dia. 6: Black's sharp counter

Figure 2 (46-65). Black drives a wedge through his attackers.

White 48. Since this capture is gote, Black jumps to 49 and easily extricates himself. However, attacking with 1 in *Dia. 6* wouldn't accomplish anything, as Black has the clever combination of 6 and 8. If White continues the attack with 9, Black has a good counter at 10; if next White 'a', then Black strikes with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

White caps for the second time with 50, but he can't continue the attack after Black attaches at 51. If White hanes at 1 in *Dia. 7* in-


stead of 52, he just helps Black to make good shape with 2 to 6. Cutting with White 'a'—Black 'b'—Black 'c' rebounds on White: Black ataris at 'd' and keeps on pushing up towards the edge, cutting off the white group to the left. One of White's main worries at this stage of the game is that his supposed thickness on the top left looks like turning into thinness.




Dia. 7: risky for White

Kobayashi: 'White 54 was an all-out move. If White had played something more conventional, like 59 or a diagonal connection below 60, my intention was to play at 57. I welcomed the opportunity to play 55.'

White 56 may seem to be helping Black — even without White's prompting, Black would like to reinforce at 57 — but on this occasion White has no choice. If he pushes along at 1 in *Dia. 8* immediately, his group to the left will come under attack. After 2 to 8 —



*Dia. 8: an overlay
7: connects*




Dia. 9: good for Black

Dia. 9. White can rescue his group with 1 to 13, but he won't be happy with the result when Black extends to 14.

If instead of 1 in *Dia. 8* White plays at 'a', Black jumps to 'b' and aims next at Black 6, White 4, Black 8.

Because of White 58, Black is able to push straight down with 61 and 63. Having a wedge driven through his wall like this is terrible for White. Instead of 62 —

Dia. 10. If White blocks at 1, Black cuts with 2 to 8; if White 9, Black attacks with 10 and 12. Next —



Dia. 10: White resists

Dia. 11: a bad ko

Dia. 11. If White 1 and 3, a ko follows after 8. White was probably afraid of this. Cutting at 'a' would give Black plenty of ko threats.

When professionals at the Nihon Ki-in saw Black 63, most of them agreed that Black would win.





Figure 3 (66-97)

Figure 3 (66-97). An abrupt end


Kobayashi: 'Instead of 66, White should at least try 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12*. After Black links up with 4 and 6, White cuts at 9 and challenges Black to a fight. This is how I would have played with White. Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' seem best. This would have led to a more drawn-out game.'

Note that White won't want to capture the two black stones below by blocking at 3 in *Dia. 13*. Black makes a diagonal connection with 6 and 8, then encroaches on the bottom area

with 10. If next White 'a', he does cut off two stones, but Black will switch to 'b'. When you remember the isolated white stone on the right side, it's clear that White's position would be irretrievable.



Dia. 12: better for White?




Dia. 13: bad for White

Kobayashi: 'When I jumped to 73 [the last move played on the first day], I believed I was ahead.'

With 76 and 78, Awaji launches on his final attempt to turn the game around. Instead of 80, White could exchange A for Black B, creating the option of further play here later, but emotionally Awaji can't play in such a leisurely fashion.


Black 81 clinches the game. If White answers by pulling back at 1 in *Dia. 14* (next page), Black plans to continue with 2 to 8. If White next pushes up with 'a', Black will attach at 'b': White won't be able to stop him from coming in. If Black keeps sente and switches to 'c', he will swallow up the solitary white stone on a large scale.



Dia. 14: good for Black

White resists valiantly with 86, but Black has a skilful counter: first he peeps at 87, then presses at 89, followed by the hane plus connection of 91 and 93. This kind of play shows Kobayashi in typical form: when he's ahead, he plays severely to make completely certain of his win.

White cuts with 94 and 96, whereupon Black delivers the coup de grace with 97. White resigns, but if he were to continue, his only move is at 1 in Dia. 15.



Dia. 15

7: connects (above 1)

Dia. 15. If White 1, squeezing with 2 to 8 feels good. Black then switches to 10, seizing the upper hand on the right side. White's position is hopeless. Black 'a' is sente, so if Black invades at 'b', White can't do anything about it.

The game ended after 97 moves at 10:53 on the morning of the second day, making it the shortest game and the earliest finish in the history of the Meijin title match. But Awaji did

not disgrace himself: he did as well against Kobayashi as anyone else has been able to recently and perhaps made him work harder than some.

Technically, Kobayashi is of course a master of the game, but he's also mastered the psychological side of competing at the top, and that's what makes him such a formidable player.

White resigns after Black 97.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 39 minutes.

Black: 3 hours 50 minutes.

(Kido, December 1989. Meijin report translated by John Power.)



Kobayashi completes his first successful defence of the Meijin title.

Coming up in our next issue

- Monster go: an historic experiment on a 21x21 go board.
- Showdown between the Fujitsu and Ing world champions: Takemiya's triumph in Seoul.
- Fujitsu Cup upsets: some of the highlights from the 3rd Fujitsu Cup, including Jimmy Cha's shock win over Cho Chikun and the 14-year-old Lee's triumph against Takemiya.
- Michael Redmond Challenges Otake: Michael pushes Otake hard in a game from the Tengen tournament + Michael describes the tesujis that have made the most vivid impression on him in his games.

And many other articles

The 2nd IBM Lightning Go Championship

This tournament was completed some time ago, but until now we have not had space to present the final. We would like to remedy that now, because it is an interesting and instructive game.

The pairing in the final came as no surprise. In contrast to the 1st Cup, Ishida did refuse to predict he would win the title, but it was obvious that he was determined to follow Takemiya's example in the 2nd Fujitsu Cup and repeat his triumph. Otake was another favourite because of his track record in lightning tournaments: he has won 13 of them, which matches the record held by Sakata, and a nickname of his is 'the god of lightning go'. As we will see, however, Ishida did come very close to pulling it off a second time.



今のところ、ローマ字タイトルの神様じゃ

The caption: 'Nowadays I'm the god of the alphabet titles.' Earlier in the year Otake won his second NEC Cup. The sign behind Otake, 'hayago no kami sama', means 'the god of lightning go'. (Cartoon by Ayuzawa Makoto.)

White: Otake Hideo 9-dan

Black: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2; **time:** 30 minutes each, followed by 30 seconds byo-yomi. Played on 7 October 1989.

Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-50). *A slight edge for Black?*

Black 1, 3. Once again Ishida shows his fondness for the 5-3 point (mokuhashushi).

He's an expert in the taisha joseki, which begins with 7, so like Redmond in the first round (see GW56, page 26), Otake avoids the complicated versions and plays 12. If White played 12 at 13, then whatever version of the joseki followed, Black's 1-5 enclosure would be bound to play an effective role.

White 22 is Takemiya style. Following up with another kosumi, that is, 24 at 'a', would be feasible, but White would be putting all his eggs in one basket. The same applies to 24 at 36. If Black laid waste to the bottom area, the game would be over.






Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1: better for White?



Dia. 2: good for Black

White 28. If at 29, Black will switch to a second approach move at 'b'. However, extending at 28 gives Black a good cut at 29. Ishida Akira suggested following Dia. 1. White

forces with 3 and 5, then threatens Black's eye shape with 7 and 9. This way White should be able to expand his bottom territory.

Black 33 shows good judgement. If Black is in a hurry to capture with 37, White gets a good move at 'c'.

White 34. White tenukis because he has no good move. If he defends at 'd', Black will capture at 37 and be more than satisfied. If instead he captures two stones with 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black should have no trouble settling his group after the crosscut of 2 and 4.

Not being able to find a move he's happy with, Otake switches to the right with 34, but Black is quite satisfied to invade at 35, then capture at 37. This result seems to give him an edge in the fuseki.

After the game —

Otake: White's play was slack. Black was way ahead.

Ishida: Otake played a slack opening on purpose. I didn't know what to do.

Otake is known for favouring thickness in the fuseki. He may seem to start slowly, but he uses his thickness to overhaul the opponent later. This is his secret for winning lightning games.





Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). Relying on intuition.

Black 51. Otake thought that this manoeuvre was not worthwhile. Black takes a lot of profit up to 61, but he ends in gote. Otake advocated using 51 to reduce White's moyo with 'a'.



Dia. 3: Ishida's oversight

Ishida: I made a miscalculation. Instead of 55, I had intended to hane at 61, but I realized that White would counter with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 3*, which would be bad for Black. Even so, Black does take profit up to 61, so there's no doubt that he still has the lead. No matter how many times we played this game, I'd always take Black.

Answering 65 by jumping in at 66 seems unreasonable. He should defend his moyo with White 95.

Black 71. Better to push up at 72: White 'b', Black 100, White 'c' would follow, after which Black could make a diagonal connection at 'd'. This would have made his group quite secure and given him a good game.

Both players were playing very quickly at this stage, especially Otake, so moves like 66 and 71 reflect their instinctive approach to the game. Otake doesn't like moyo contests, so he jumped the other way with 66. Perhaps also he judged intuitively that White 66 at 95 would have left him a little behind. Likewise, Black 71 shows Ishida's cautiousness. If Black pushed up at 72, he might wrap up the game more quickly, but on the other hand there is a risk of the group's being cut off. Ishida reasoned that 71 to 75 were good enough to secure a win. The only thing is, he did regret not playing 77 at 92.

Figure 3 (101-150). Ishida falls for the bluff.

White 12 is the first in a series of risky moves Otake plays in a desperate attempt to catch up. Usually you'd expect White to block at 15, but if Black pushed up at 16, which would be sente, then defended at 'a', the game would clearly be a loss for White.

The tenuki of 16 is another do-or-die move, but it is too reckless. White is defying Black to kill his group, but Black passes up the invitation. Black 19 becomes the game-losing move. Otake (later): 'If you'd made a placement, I

would have died, wouldn't I?' 'Yes, this was terrible,' replied Ishida, looking disconsolate. 'I was tricked.'




Figure 3 (101-150)

White to live, which means, in turn, that White has played 12 and 16 for free. That is enough to upset Black's lead.






Figure 4 (151-219)
119: connects (left of 117)



Dia. 4: a one-sided ko



Dia. 5: a simpler ko

Dia. 4. Ishida should have attacked White's eye shape from the inside with 1. The best White can do is to get a ko at 'a' after 2 to 10. This is a ko in which Black has nothing at stake. Even if White connects at 5 instead of 2, Black still gets a ko with 2 or 4. White would probably have no choice but to resign. For Ishida, known for his skill at life-and-death problems, this was an unbelievable oversight.

Dia. 5. An even simpler way to attack the group is Black 1 and 3. Next, Black gets a ko with 5. He doesn't have to start the ko immediately; just having it available as an option would be better than what happens in the game.

Ishida hallucinated: he expected White to answer 23 at 'b', which would let Black strike at 'c'. The result is that Black has just helped

Figure 4 (151-219). *Seniority pays.*

When he plays 56, White is certain of winning.

Ishida: I often get tricked by Otake.

Otake: Junior disciples are easy to fool.

These were the first words the players exchanged after the game. However, Ishida had only himself to blame for letting Otake get away with the risks he took.

White wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Go Weekly, 24 October 1989)

Order Your Own Set of Japanese Stamps Commemorating Go

While our supplies last, get your own set of the Go stamps issued in Japan last year. We will send you both stamps in mint condition and mounted on a display card. Just send \$10 plus \$1 s/h to Ishi Press International, 1400 N. Shoreline Blvd., Bldg. A7, Mountain View, CA 94043. US check, postal money order, or charge to your VISA or Mastercard only please.

The 28th Judan Title, Game One

Takemiya's Brilliant Start

Takemiya Masaki started off his Judan challenge this year with brilliant wins in the first and second games. In fact, March 1990 stands out as one of the peak months of his whole career. The first game of the title match was a masterly win with white; it was also his first win ever in a best-of-five title match, following a mystifying 15-game losing streak. In the second game he delighted go fans with a fuseki that was adventuresome even by his standards, reminding one of the heady experimentation of the New Fuseki period in the 1930's. Below we present the first game; for reasons of space, we must ask readers to wait until our next issue for the second.

White: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo & Judan

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 6 hours each.

Played on 8 March 1990.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

Cho starts the first fight with his ladder break of 25. An exchange follows: White makes a ponnuki and Black splits open the top. Most pros felt White could be satisfied when he made his second ponnuki with 36.

Pressing at 50 when Cho starts to reduce the bottom moyo is Takemiya style. It wouldn't occur to most players to press when Black already has the reinforcement of 47 in place, but Takemiya believes in linking up his groups.




Figure 2 (50-100)

64: connects (at 57)

Figure 2 (51-100)

Black 99 may be the losing move: Black should descend at A, making miai of linking up to the right and to the left and attacking White's eye shape, all in sente.




Figure 3 (101-174)

ko: 59, 64, 67

Figure 3 (101-174)


Black seems to have made a misreading in the fight at the top: taking gote with 11 could not have been part of his plan. After 12 White takes charge of the game.

Black resigns after White 174.


36 Tesuji Patterns: Answers

Answer to Problem 25

Dia. 1. To tenuki after sliding into the corner with the marked stone shows a wilful disregard for the joseki. If White wants to switch elsewhere, he shouldn't play the marked stone in the first place. Black can punish White for his mistake by peeping at 1, then blocking at 3. Permitting Black 'a' next would be unbearable, so —




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: a bad exchange

Dia. 2. White has little choice but to play 4 and 6. It now becomes obvious that the exchange of the marked stones is awful for White. Without it —

Dia. 3. With the shape he has on the left, White can invade the corner at 1. This is quite a contrast to Dia. 2, and it shows how much White has suffered for his tenuki.



Dia. 3: contrast




Dia. 4: the joseki

Dia. 4. If White plays the marked stone, he must continue by sliding to 1. Since the aim of a move like the marked stone is to make a base on the side, it's meaningless without the follow-up at 1.


Answer to Problem 26

Dia. 1. This kind of shape comes up often in actual play, so the tesuji is worth remembering. First, Black wedges in at 1, then whichever side White answers on he follows up with the contact play underneath at 3. This combination cuts White into two. That means that the four white stones in the corner are captured. Of

course, White could save the corner stones by playing 2 at 'a' — see Dia. 4.




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: good for Black

Dia. 2. White 1 and Black 2 will follow. The power of White's ponnuki is nullified by the strong black position adjacent to it, so it's not worth much.

Dia. 3. Resisting with 1 doesn't lead anywhere. White just loses an extra stone.



Dia. 3: futile



Dia. 4: excellent thickness


Dia. 4. As mentioned above, White could save his corner stones by banging into Black with 2, but this lets Black build impressive outside thickness with 3 to 9, so the result is much worse for White. Moreover, his original jump towards the centre is now meaningless.

Answer to Problem 27


Dia. 1. Before looking at the answer, we would like to discuss Black's proper attitude when White invades the 3-3 point like this. A lot of players get upset when they see their 'territory' being destroyed, but they are mistaken in thinking that their original framework here guarantees them all the corner territory. The truth is that there was still plenty of room for White to come in.

Actually, Black should welcome the invasion, because it gives him the chance to solidify his position and secure genuine territory, or, as in this case, build useful influence.

As for Black's continuation, jumping down to 1 is most popular



Dia. 1: the popular move




Dia. 2: influence


Dia. 2. White will seek life with the 2-4 combination. Black must atari at 5 immediately, or White will gain points by making a hane to the right of 3. Black then defends his cutting point with 7, forcing White 8. Black can be satisfied with the centre influence he has secured.

Dia. 3. If White switches elsewhere after Black plays the marked stone, Black can make the placement at 1. A difficult fight will follow

after White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'; in this case, the presence of the marked black stone and the stone underneath the bottom centre star point ensures that White won't be able to break out, so Black will kill the group.



Dia. 3: tenuki unreasonable



Dia. 4: dubious


Dia. 4. Black 1, an atekomi, is also possible, but there is a danger that White will switch elsewhere after Black 5. The corner fight will be tricky, so playing this way is dubious.

(*Let's Go*, September 1983)


36 Life and Death Patterns: Answers

Answer to Problem 25

Dia. 1. The only move Black has is the hane at 1. White 2 is forced, so Black can get a ko with 3 and 5. This is the correct answer. Note that White has got time to connect at 'a', as even after Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', the position is still a ko.



Dia. 1: ko




Dia. 2: wrong for White


Dia. 2. White 2 is a mistake; the peep at 5 ensures an eye for Black, as he will get four stones in a row on the second line. Note that Black 5 at 'a' would be wrong: White would block at 5, killing Black.

Dia. 3. Black 3 is wrong. Because he has the marked stone in place, White can stop Black from getting an eye.

Dia. 4. Successive hanes on each side sometimes work but not here. If White 4 at 'a', Black gets an eye with a diagonal connection (from 1 or 3), but all White has to do is to capture at 4.




Dia. 3: wrong for Black



Dia. 4: wrong


Answer to Problem 26

Dia. 1. As the proverb indicates, the 2-1 point is often the vital point in the corner. Here, attaching at 1 enables White to get a ko. Black's strongest answer is 2, so a ko follows. Note that if Black started with a placement at 2 instead of the marked stone, the same ko would follow. Actually both these moves are wrong for Black: the way to kill White is simply to crawl at 'a' without making a placement first.



Dia. 1: ko


Dia. 2. Black 2 is wrong: White secures unconditional life with 3, thanks to the hane (the marked stone). In effect, a hane increases the size of your living space.



Dia. 2: wrong for Black

Dia. 3: wrong for White

Dia. 3. White 1 is the other 2-1 point, but it is a dismal failure. The proverb leaves it up to you to work out which of the two 2-1 points is the right one. White dies.




Dia. 4: dead

Dia. 4. If White plays 1 to expand his living space, Black seizes the vital point with 2. If next White 'a', then Black 'b'; if instead White 'b', then after Black 'c', White 'a', Black will connect at 'b', making one large eye and killing White.

Answer to Problem 27

Dia. 1. The key to this problem is also the 2-1 point, but the theme is completely different: to lead Black into shortage of liberties. This is probably an extremely difficult problem to solve if you haven't seen one with the same theme before.




Dia. 1: correct


Black must capture at 2, whereupon White makes another sacrifice with 3. White's aim is to fight the ko here. If Black intercepts at 'a', White ataris with 'b', then lives unconditional-

ly with 'c'. If Black attacks White's living space with 2 at 'c', White counters with White 3, Black 2, White 'a', giving a ko. If White wins the ko, he catches Black in an oi-otoshi (successive ataris making capture unavoidable).

Dia. 2. Black will fight the ko, of course, but let's assume that White has more ko threats and forces him to connect at 4, then at 6. White then turns in on himself and secures unconditional life, as this makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.




Dia. 2: continuation



Dia. 3: failure

Dia. 3. Simply playing a hane in sente with 1 achieves nothing. White runs out of steam immediately when Black blocks at 1. White 1 at 'a' sees the group killed by Black 'b'.




Dia. 4: alive

Dia. 4. Black 2 may look like a tricky answer, but this way too the tesuji of 3 works. Black 4 is the only move, but then White drops back inside his position with 5. If Black 6, White 7 sets up an oi-otoshi capture, thanks to the presence of the two stones on the right edge.


(Let's Go, September 1983)

Two Semeai Problems

In both of the problems below, Black is asked to win the semeai (capturing race)



Problem 1



Problem 2

Answers on page 68.

The Second Line


When to Play on It, When to Leave It Alone

Sometimes a move on the second line is urgent, sometimes it can be postponed till much later in the game. If you play on the second line too early, Takemiya will laugh at you, but if you neglect to take a vital point on the second line your group may get into bad trouble.


The aim of this article is to teach you how to tell the difference between urgent and non-urgent moves on the second line. We hope to make clear what the criteria are for making the

correct judgement.


The diagram below is an excellent illustration to start the ball rolling. White 1 in the top right and bottom left is the same move, but in one case it is a very good move, in the other a very bad one. Before turning the page, please work out which is which, not forgetting to formulate your reasons. Even if you get the answer right, we are confident that you will still be able to learn a lot from our article.



Two Tesuji Problems



1. Black has a clever move.



2. Black can capture White.

Answers on page 68.

The answer to the problem on the previous page is that White 1 in the top right is bad, but White 1 in the bottom left is good. The key lies in the location of the black pincers. The detailed reasons will become clear in the course of reading the analysis that follows.

An urgent 2nd-line move






Illustration 1

Sliding along the second line here is urgent (by coincidence, this position is treated in 36 *Tesuji Patterns* in this issue, so we ask the reader's indulgence for the duplication), but many players will have been tempted to switch somewhere else or perhaps to make a counterattack against the marked black stone. However, securing one's own base takes priority, so White 1 is essential.




Dia. 1: who's attacking whom?

Dia. 1. White may be tempted to make use of the background support of the marked stone to launch an attack at 1, but he will meet with the powerful counterattack of 2 to 8. This turns the tables on the would-be attacker.



Dia. 2: terrible for White

Dia. 2. If White decides to move out into the centre ahead of Black with 1, Black will strike with 2 and 4, which is very painful. Making bad shape with 'a' to forestall the cut will be almost unbearable. The two black groups are just about settled, while White doesn't have even one eye.



Dia. 3: correct strategy

Dia. 3. If White is determined to counterattack with a pincer, then he should omit the small-knight slide into the corner. If Black attacks with Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c', then this time White can ignore him and jump to 3 (Black can't force him to make bad shape as in *Dia. 2*). Black will probably answer with 2, but White can be satisfied with jumping into the centre with 3.

A non-urgent 2nd-line move





Illustration 2

Black 1 is not the kind of move you see very often so early in the game — can you give the reason?


Dia. 1. The most important criterion for determining the urgency of a move on the 2nd line is the effect it has on the base for both sides. Even a move worth one or two dozen points is a mere endgame move if it does not affect one's own or the opponent's base. It's up to you to work out the difference.

How will White answer the marked stone? The chances of his defending the corner with 1 are very slight. If he did, Black would extend

to 2, satisfied that the marked stone is now a very good move.




Dia. 1: unlikely




Dia. 2: a severe counter

Dia. 2. White is more likely to attack at 1. If Black does nothing, White 'a' is a sharp follow-up.

Dia. 3. If White wanted to focus on the lower part of the board, he might jump to 1 instead of making a pincer attack at the top. This applies pressure on the solitary black stone on the right side. Black is allowed to defend at 2 at the top, but the exchange of the marked black stone and White 1 is overwhelmingly in White's favour. It should be obvious that Black has played a non-urgent move.




Dia. 3: an unnecessary move




Dia. 4: the joseki

Dia. 4. The joseki, of course, is to extend to 1, securing a large-scale base at the top.

Dia. 5. If Black wants to do something in the corner once he has the marked stone in place, attaching at 1 is the move. This is much more profitable than a diagonal move at 3. The continuation to 5 is a set pattern.




Dia. 5: standard continuation



Dia. 6: no problem

Dia. 6. Black doesn't have to worry about White's counter at 2. By adding a stone at 5, he

forces White to backtrack at 6, so the result is that White has given Black extra profit.



Dia. 7: after the joseki

Dia. 7. To conclude, we would like to show the follow-up after the joseki pattern. Either 1 or 'a' will be a good point for Black, but note that both these moves will work well because Black has made the proper extension at the top (the marked stone).

A large descent





Illustration 3

A surprisingly large number of players don't understand the real value of a move like 1. It's one of the largest moves you can play on the 2nd line. The reason?

Numerically, Black 1 is worth over 20 points in gote, but that's not why we call it a large move. More important is the fact that it is a key point for making a base for both sides.




Dia. 1: White gains

Dia. 1. People who like to attack might be tempted to make a pincer at 1 immediately. We can't call this a bad move, and in fact, if the top left area were important, it might well be a good move.


However, Black usually suffers a loss by

letting White build a base with 2 and 4. White's group is just about secure, but in contrast Black is vulnerable to an attack at 'a'.

Dia. 2. On the other hand, if Black extends down the side at 1, White takes profit with 2 and 4 while also securing a base. This is a painful result for Black.




Dia. 2: bad for Black




Dia. 3: timid

Dia. 3. A timid player might connect solidly at 1, but this is also painful when you consider the extra territory Black could have had by extending to 'a'.



Dia. 4: White is insecure

Dia. 4. Let's assume that Black has the marked stone in place in the top left corner. Descending at 1 ensures that a black extension to 'a' will be a powerful threat. Even when White has made the extension to 2, he still has to worry about the invasion point of 'b', so Black can look forward to harassing the group.



Dia. 5: an exception

Dia. 5. This game is an exception. Takemiya, playing black, preferred to switch to 4 rather

than descend at 5. Permitting White 5 didn't worry him at all. However, there are two reasons for this: the presence of the marked white stone meant that he couldn't expect to attack White in this area, and 4 is a big moyo-building move.

Don't be in a hurry to play miai points.





Illustration 4


'Black 1 and 3 secure quite a bit of profit, and moreover White won't be able to tenuki.' The reasoning is correct so far as it goes, but—

One often finds amateur players making aji-keshi moves, that is, moves that settle the position and erase aji or the various different options existing in the position. For example, when you have two different possible forcing moves, it's hard to resist the temptation to play one of them and get it over and done with, even though it may not be till much later that you know which forcing move will be the more effective.

Dia. 1. True enough, if Black plays 1 and 3, White is forced to secure a base for the group. Black is probably satisfied with having taken profit in sente, but if you look at the position more closely you realize that that is all he has done. Black doesn't need to make this capture to secure his base, and in many cases he may lose more than he has gained by permitting White to slide along the top at 4.



Dia. 1: a dubious gain




Dia. 2: the other option


Dia. 2. Depending on the overall position, it's quite possible that Black 1 or 'a' might be a

very effective forcing move. In that case, it's better strategy for Black to wait until he knows which forcing move will work better in the context of a whole-board strategy.

Dia. 3. The original position is the result of this joseki. During the course of it, there is a 2nd-line move that is essential: capturing with Black 12. If omitted —




Dia. 3: the joseki




Dia. 4: tenuki is bad

Dia. 4. Connecting at White 1 is very big. In contrast to *Dia. 3*, Black has no base.

Dia. 5. This is a variation of the joseki worth remembering. Black makes a solid connection instead of a diagonal one. The drawback is that Black doesn't get such good eye shape, but as compensation he gains sente. Note that the 2nd-line move of 3 is essential.




Dia. 5: joseki variation



Dia. 6: contrast

Dia. 6. The contrast in the strength of the white and black groups when White is allowed to descend at 1 is striking. It's clear that this is the key point for securing a base for both sides.



Dia. 7: unbearable

White 4 in *Dia. 5* is another essential 2nd-line move. Permitting Black 1 in *Dia. 7* would be unbearable. We can't repeat often enough that the criterion for deciding the importance of a 2nd-line move is the role it plays in securing or taking away a base.

The importance of securing a base





Illustration 5


Is Black 1 solid and steady or is it timid? The answer depends on whether you assess the black position as weak or as strong.

Black 1 is the same kind of move as in *Illustration 1*, but probably fewer people are aware of the importance of this move. Even without it, Black seems to have a fairly secure base. But if you look more closely —



Dia. 1: temptation

Dia. 1. The temptation to make an approach move at 1 is only natural. However, this is just what White wants: he is delighted at getting the chance to make the pincer at 2. Black is not likely to jump out from 1, as that would create a weak, floating group, so the corner-invasion joseki to 11 is likely. What does White do now?



Dia. 2: a severe attack

Dia. 2. White 1 is the vital point. Black will hastily turn at 2, but White can force with 3 and 5 before defending. Black has lost his base and will have to flee into the centre, so White has seized control of the game.

Dia. 3 (next page). That is why adding the stone at 1 is correct. If this group is secure, Black will be able to fight more strongly in other areas. Note that Black 1 at 'a' would be bad: White would answer at 'b'.

recommend you to follow Dia. 4, as you make more progress from playing the sharper move.

Sparring in the fuseki





Illustration 7


This is a more complex position than the ones we have looked at so far. The question is whether White 1 and 3 are necessary.

Actually these moves are a joseki, though perhaps one known only to players who have studied the Chinese Opening in depth.



Dia. 1: the joseki

Dia. 1. This is the joseki sequence. It comes up only in the Chinese Opening. Since White is playing inside Black's sphere of influence, his aim with 2 and 6 is to settle his group as quickly as possible. For his part, Black can't let him secure himself too easily or his influence will go to waste. That's why he attacks with 7 to 11. Now, let's look at the reasons for White 12 and 14.




Dia. 2: too cramped


Dia. 2. If White simply connects at 1, Black 2 is a severe follow-up. Blocking at 'a' will not secure two eyes, so White will have to flee through the centre, coming under considerable harassment in the process.

Dia. 3. That is why White plays 1 and 3.

The possibility of Black 4 does not worry him, as he can counter with the cut of 5. If Black 'a' after 7, then White 'b' — this fight is obviously unreasonable for Black. Therefore —



Dia. 3: unreasonable for Black



Dia. 4: White is satisfied

Dia. 4. Black will defend at 1, letting White connect at 2. White has achieved his objective: he now has comfortable eye space, so there will be no constraints on him in the ensuing fighting.

How to tell when a move is urgent

Finally we come to the situation in the problem posed at the beginning of this article, but we are confident that by now the reader has worked out the answer himself. Just to round off the article, however, we would like to analyse the problem.





Illustration 8


Is White 1 an urgent move? What difference does it make to the value of 1 when the marked black stone is at A?

Needless to say, no move has an absolute value: everything hinges on the surrounding position.

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a big move, but when Black has the distant pincer (the marked stone), White has room to extend to 2, which just about settles his group.



Dia. 1: room to live




Dia. 2: miai

Dia. 2. If Black attacks at 1, then White turns at 2. In short, these two points are miai: whichever one the opponent takes, you can take the other. The general principle with miai points is not to play them until you have to or until you can judge for certain which of the two points will be more profitable to you. The obvious conclusion is that White 1 in Illustration 8 is not an urgent move.


Dia. 3. If White has the marked stone in place, he can force with 1 and 3, then make a severe attack at 5. Turning on the second line into the corner is irrelevant to the overall position.

Dia. 4. When the marked stone is the narrow pincer, things are different. If White does


nothing, Black 1 will be very severe. White has to run out into the centre with 2, a move that helps Black to surround territory with 3 while continuing his attack. This would be an ideal development for Black.



Dia. 3: a whole-board strategy



Dia. 4: cramped for space



Dia. 5: essential


Dia. 5. The conclusion is that White 1 is essential. A 2nd-line move that secures a base for an unstable group is always big, no matter how early in the fuseki it is played. It may decide who takes the initiative in the whole game.

(*Let's Go*, February 1990)

Good Style and Correct Shape


Cho Chikun, Honinbo

The problems in this instalment, which concludes our series, don't have much in common except for a basic technique that is the first step towards the solution in each.




Problem 26: Black to play

This position comes from a standard joseki. Black's next move is essential.




Problem 27: Black to play

Black can exploit the weak points in White's corner position.



Problem 28: Black to play

In answering White 1, Black can use the aji of his marked stone.



Problem 29: Black to Play

This problem is a little more complicated. White has not yet made his eye shape, but before doing so he attempts to play 1 in sente. The threat of White 'a' is of course big, but even so White 1 is not correct. How can Black take advantage of White's mistake?

Answers on page 57

Go Topics, Go Trivia



Chen Zude 9-dan

Chen Zude Makes a Comeback

Chen Zude, one of the pioneers who built the groundwork for China's eminence in go, has made a comeback to active play after a prolonged but successful fight with stomach cancer. Born in Shanghai in March 1944, Chen was the first mainland Chinese player able to play top Japanese players on equal terms and until the emergence of Nie Weiping he was the Chinese number one, winning the individual championship three times. In 1973 he won a game against Go Seigen, taking black with no komi, and in the same year he beat Kato

Masao, then 7-dan, in a game on even. His best result in three tours of Japan was 3—4 in 1978. In 1980 he contracted stomach cancer and did not play for his country at all during the 1980's, though he did recover his health sufficiently to act as the non-playing captain of Chinese go delegations and to take on the post of Vice President of the International Go Federation. This year he finally made his long-awaited comeback to active play, joining the preliminary rounds of the Tianyuan title on 3 February. Unfortunately, he lost his first game. It will probably take a while to get over the ten-year hiatus in his career, but the many fans of this modest and courtly player are hoping he will make his way back to the top.

Four Top Players Pass 1,000 Games Sakata Passes 1,000 Wins

Last year an inquisitive reporter going through the records discovered that the first game of the 1989 Meijin title match was Kobayashi Koichi's 1,000th game as a professional player. Further checking showed that within a space of a month of so four top players born since the war passed this landmark. Looking at the standings on 15 September, the day Kobayashi finished the Meijin game, the other players stood as follows: Cho Chikun 1,004, Takemiya 1,003, and Ishida Yoshio 997. Kato was quite a bit ahead of them, on 1147. The other interesting point was that their winning percentages were quite close too, though here Kobayashi had the lead. In fact, he is the first and only top modern player

to achieve a winning percentage of 70%. (Yoda Norimoto has won 76.9% of his games so far — 360 wins to 108 losses — but he has yet to take an open title and the majority of his games are not against top players. Kobayashi's winning percentage at the same stage of his career, that is, after the first ten years, was even higher: 77.2%. When most of your games are against the other top players and you play in a lot of title matches, no one can keep winning such a high proportion of his games.)

Unfortunately, Kobayashi lost his 1,000th game, and the same thing happened to Ishida Yoshio. In Ishida's case, the landmark game was the IBM final against Otake given in this issue.

After *Go Weekly* featured these statistics in a front-page article (in a week in which there was no title match result to report), it occurred to some one to check up on some of the older players, born before the war. These players are handicapped for several reasons. When they were young, there were very few tournaments besides the rating tournament, so they could only hope to play about 20 games a year. The proliferation of newspaper tournaments did not begin till the mid-1950s. Also, the war caused a considerable interruption to the careers of older players. The number of games played eventually dwindled to nothing as the war progressed, not to mention the fact that quite a few go players were drafted. Even so, it was found that one older player has set some records that the younger players are still a long way from surpassing.



Sakata Eio, the first and only Japanese professional to score 1,000 wins.

Sakata Eio, who turned 70 in February this year and has been a professional for 55 years, recorded his 1,000th win in 1986. Actually, he probably reached it earlier, but the records of some of his prewar games have been lost. Of course, Sakata has, in winning a total of 64 titles, set a record that many think may never be broken. At one stage in his career, from 1962 to 1965, he won 16 title matches in a row. He also holds two other almost unapproachable records: winning 17 games in a row in Honinbo title matches and a winning percentage of 93.75 (30 wins, 2 losses, winning six out of the seven titles) in 1964.

As of 30 April 1990, the top ten in the standings are (jigos not included in winning percentages):

1. Sakata: 1644 games played: 1068 wins, 560 losses, 16 jigos = 65.6%
2. Rin Kaiho: 1363: 888-474-1 = 65.2%
3. Fujisawa Shuko: 1346: 770-566-10 = 57.6%
4. Otake: 1254: 802-446-6 = 64.2%
5. Kato: 1169: 783-384-2 = 67.1%
6. Takemiya: 1038: 689-346-3 = 66.5%
7. Cho Chikun: 1034: 712-319-3 = 69%
8. Kobayashi: 1028: 725-301-2 = 70.6%
9. Ishida Yoshio: 1021: 658-363 = 64.4%
10. Go Seigen: 794: 528-241-25 = 68.66%.

We have placed Go Seigen 10th on the list, but to tell the truth we do not have statistics available on other players, so it's almost certain that players such as Hashimoto Uтарo and Fujisawa Hosai would actually take high places on the list of total games played. Also, note that the above statistics only include games officially recognized by the Nihon Ki-in. There are many anomalies, especially concerning international games. For example, the Super Go and Japan-China Exchange games are not included, and the Fujitsu and IBM Cup games were only counted as part of the official record from the second year of these tournaments. The above statistics, therefore, don't give the whole picture, but they are still of interest.

102-year-old player wins promotion

A Japanese amateur player set a record in January this year by winning promotion to 5-

dan at the age of 102. He is Mitsuyoshi Chujiro and he won the promotion by scoring high points in a promotion test published in *Kido*. According to the Nihon Ki-in, this is the first time a player over 100 has won promotion to a high amateur dan. Mitsuyoshi is the oldest male in his home prefecture of Tottori. He said: 'It's thanks to go that I've avoided becoming senile. I'm now aiming at 6-dan.'

Just for the record, the oldest active professional is Hashimoto Uтарo, still playing at the age of 83. It would be interesting to get the statistics on his 68-year career.

Both Sides Lose

The new Japanese rules of go, adopted by both the Nihon Ki-in and Kansai Ki-in last year, have an interesting twist: in certain cases both players can lose a game. The other day two 9-dans got a shock when they became the first players to whom this ruling was applied. The players involved were Haruyama and Hane. During their quarter-final game in the 16th Tengen tournament a stone somehow got moved to an adjacent intersection. Neither player noticed, so they kept on playing. Eventually one player placed a stone on the intersection where the other stone had originally been played. The game recorder had noticed before this and had called in the referee (one player acts as referee for all the games being played at the Nihon Ki-in on a particular day). The relevant rule states that if a stone is found to have moved and the players can't agree where it should be, both lose. This case was a little different, but the problem was that the game had continued for so long after the accident, so the referee, Kaji 8-dan, declared it a loss for both players. They accepted the ver-

dict, so there was no problem. That gave Ohira a free ride to the semifinals.

The Tengen tournament seems to be jinxed. The Rin-Ishigure dispute described in this column in the previous issue also occurred in the Tengen tournament. However, Hane and Haruyama can take heart from the fact that the following year Rin went on to win the title.

1-dan beats 9-dan


For the second time since the founding of the Nihon Ki-in in 1924, a 1-dan has beaten a 9-dan in an even game, and once again the redoubtable 1-dan is a woman. The first was Ninomiya Hideko (now 3-dan and the wife of Komatsu 6-dan), who defeated Chino 9-dan in 1983 (the game is given in GW35, where we mistakenly gave the date as 1984). The second is Abe Yumiko, the 19-year-old eldest daughter of Abe 9-dan, and she defeated Ishii Mamoru 9-dan in a TV game by killing a large group. Abe 9-dan was surprised, for, as he commented, *he* couldn't beat Ishii.




Abe 1-dan

Good Style and Correct Shape: Answers

Answer to Problem 26



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: follow-up

Dia. 1. Black must make a throw-in at 1. This defends his cutting point at 'a' and also attacks White's eye shape. If White captures at 'b', Black can atari at 'c', then connect at 'a' if White connects. White will be dissatisfied with his inefficient dumpling shape. He usually has to continue with an extension to 'd'.

Dia. 2. If Black later gets the marked stone in place, then Black 1 will be a very severe attack. White will have to atari at 'a' to live or

strengthen Black by playing White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. Either result would be painful for him. Depending on the overall position, it might be feasible to attack at 1 without the marked stone.




Dia. 3: slack

Dia. 3. Simply making an atari at 1 is very slack. Giving White an eye at 'a' takes away all the effectiveness of a black attack at 'b'.

Answer to Problem 27

Dia. 1. As you can see from the first problem, throw-ins are the theme of this installment, but Black 1 is the wrong throw-in. Black gains nothing.




Dia. 1: wrong

Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. Black must start with a sacrifice at 1. Now White won't have time to link up the tail end of his group.

Answer to Problem 28

Dia. 1. Black 1 fails to make use of the marked stone.




Dia. 1: wrong

Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. Black should make a throw-in at 1. After 2, Black pulls back at 3; he has gained one point because White will have to add a stone at 'a'. Note that White can't play 2 at 'b': Black will atari at 3 and White will lose every

stone he plays to the left of 1, as he can't connect at 1 because of the threat of Black 'a'.




Dia. 3: extra profit

Dia. 3. Actually Black gains a little more than one point, for when he blocks at 1 White can't connect at 'a'.

Answer to Problem 29


Dia. 1. The correct response is to make a throw-in at 1, then to connect at 3. Black gains from playing 1.



Dia. 1: correct

Dia. 2: not two eyes

Dia. 2. Assuming White later has to make two eyes on the side here, the best way to do so is with 1 and 3, but White will find that Black's throw-in has made his eye space too narrow. The placement of Black 4 keeps him down to one eye. If White 'a' after 6, then Black 'b'.



Dia. 3: alive

Dia. 3. In contrast, when Black hasn't made the throw-in the same combination will secure two eyes. That means that exchanging Black 'a' for White 'b' at the right time is important.

(Kido, December 1986)

Tewari

How to Analyse the Efficiency of Your Stones

by Takagawa Shukaku
translated by John Fairbairn

Foreword

Professionals nowadays rarely offer beginners instruction in *tewari*, a technique for analysing the relative efficiency of plays which goes back to the time of Honinbo Dosaku (1645–1702). Yet it is apparent from casual comments by the pros that it is very much part of their own battery of techniques.

The same might be said, of course, about many other fundamental aspects of the game: good shape, how to count the endgame, handling kos, and so on.

But in the early 1950s there used to be a wealth of such articles in go magazines. It is easy to imagine possible reasons for this. Democracy was taking root in postwar Japan, pros were often forced to hustle for a living, there were far fewer tournaments to occupy them . . . Whatever the real reasons, lack of this level of instruction is a sad omission from today's syllabus.

I have therefore resurrected a series of articles by the late Takagawa Shukaku on *tewari* which appeared in *Kido* throughout most of 1953. This was something of a golden year for beginners' articles. The same issues contained yearlong features on Modern Joseki and Fuseki (Sakata), Fighting Techniques in the Middle Game (Iwamoto), How to Count the Endgame (Suzuki), Different Ways of Capturing Stones (Miyashita), Definitive Analysis of Carpenter's Squares (Kitani), and the Story of Kos (Hosokawa).


To bring the articles down to a more convenient size for *Go World*, I have paraphrased parts of the original and omitted a few examples. Those who lack the marvelous but long out-of-print *Vital Points of Go* by Takagawa may incidentally be partly consoled by the fact that the material here is an extension of the *tewari* chapter in that book. (John Fairbairn)

Whether we are aware of it or not, *tewari* is one of those things present in all our games. It is a technical term and is an abbreviation of the phrase *tekazu no wariai*. Literally translated, it means apportionment, or comparison, of the number of plays. But if that were all it meant we could simply look at the number of stones in a position and make judgments along the lines of *Black has five stones, White has five — position even*. There are in fact additional nuances.


As *Dia. 1* shows, we must also take into account the efficiency of the stones. Here Black has the extra triangled stone but it is doing nothing extra for him except giving him two empty triangles. Worse, if we imagine a white stone elsewhere to balance the account, Black has made a loss. In short, he is guilty of bad shape and overconcentration of stones. *Tewari* is a simple technique for doing post mortems on positions to discover such faults. Put

another way, it is a technique for achieving maximum efficiency with the minimum number of stones.

The great Segoe Kensaku once summed it up this way: If you buy something for ¥100 and it's worth ¥100, then you have bought well. But if you spend ¥100 on something and it's worth only ¥50 or ¥70, you have wasted money. *Tewari* is just like that.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

But *tewari* has its limitations too, even as a local technique. The joseki in *Dia. 2* involves


eight stones, apportioned equally between the two players. Yet tewari can never be used to prove the result is equal. For this there is still a subjective element to be applied, or judgment born of experience.

Nevertheless, tewari could have a role even here, as can be seen by imagining an extra black stone at 'a'. It would then surely be evident that Black has wasted a stone somewhere.

There are three aspects to consider. First, how many stones does it take to do a particular job? Let us begin with the simple example of *Dia. 3*. Black has expended seven stones to make a territory of nine points in the corner. The two triangled stones are clearly unnecessary — without them Black could safely count on the same nine points. But we can go further. The stone at the star point is also unnecessary, so at most Black needs four stones to get the same effect.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Indeed, Black can get more or less the same effect by playing just two stones in the corner, as in *Dia. 4*. And that is without calculating the benefits of the missing stones when played elsewhere.

Similarly, in *Dia. 5*, Black can achieve the same effect on the edge (surrounding three points) with just the three triangled stones. However, he could do this and more by shifting these three stones to 'a', 'b' and 'c'. So position is the second important aspect to consider, although tewari tends not to concern itself with position except in a purely local context.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

The third factor is order of moves. In *Dia. 6*, Black has been able to secure this area by playing 1 then 2. But if he had played first at 2, would he then need to play at 1? Efficiency demands not.

Let us now see how this can help us in practice. *Dia. 7* is an old established joseki, but tewari analysis in fact raises a question mark over 8.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Had the starting point been the one in *Dia. 8* — a common one in actual play — would Black then play as in *Dia. 9*, giving the same result as *Dia. 7*? The truth is, Black's play here smacks of overconcentration, and he is at the same time strengthening a white position that was thin. If Black simply wanted to defend the corner he would surely omit 1 and 3 in *Dia. 9* and just play 5, leaving himself the possibility of invading at 'a' later.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Correct play for Black therefore requires him to play 8 in *Dia. 7* as in *Dia. 10*, an ideal complement to 2 and 4.

Black does not have to fear the push-and-cut manoeuvre by White, as *Dia. 11* proves. Black 20 exposes White's recklessness. Nor need Black fear invasion by White at 8, for then Black attacks at 7 and the triangled stone is ideally placed to pressure White.

In fact, even if White plays tightly by connecting at 7 (or 'a') in *Dia. 12*, Black's extension

to 8 is best. If White pushes out at 9, Black has to give way at 10, but the result up to 14 still favours him, as he makes a large profit.




Dia. 11

Dia. 12

Looking at this result under the tewari microscope, we proceed from *Dia. 13*. We can regard this as the result of removing an equal number of redundant stones (two) for both sides and adding 1 and 2. Assessing this by standard criteria, Black has territory against White's influence, but Black has the advantage of having made territory on the fourth line. White's influence is clearly not sufficient to compensate for this.

Moreover, the normal rule of thumb is that the extension from a four-stone wall should be five points, that is, to 'a'. White is therefore too cramped here. It is true that Black's extension to 1 should be a little wider, to 'b', but this is a minor defect compared to White's.



Dia. 13


Dia. 14

Now from the position of *Dia. 13*, Black would obviously not want to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 14* (giving the result of *Dia. 12*), but the replies of 2 and 4 are inefficient and, because of the narrow extension, add nothing to White's strength. Overall White has made a substantial loss.

To amplify, *Dia. 15* is a variation of this joseki where White has approached on both

sides. Black has no need to fear White 7 once he blocks at 8. If White pushes through at 9, Black can play as in *Dia. 12* by giving way at 10. (He can also block at 11, but that is a different issue.)


The result is that White's stone 1 is isolated and becomes a wasted invasion (mochikomi). This early in the game, it is like giving a stone handicap.



Dia. 15

Dia. 16

The basic pattern here is for White to invade at the 3-3 point as in *Dia. 16* or *Dia. 17*. The reason Black then plays at 10 in *Dia. 16* instead of 'a', which would give *Dia. 18*, can be explained by tewari.




Dia. 17

Dia. 18

Dia. 19


Dia. 18. If Black does block at 10 here, White connects along the side with 13, securing profit. Imagine then that White plays 'a' to force Black 'b'. This gives more or less the outcome of *Dia. 19*.

Now *Dia. 19* is the result of White's invading at the 3-3 point immediately. The sequence up to 9 is the normal one, and while the further exchanges up to 13 are not urgent they can easily occur. Would Black now play elsewhere and then stupidly answer White 'a' at 'b'? Yet that is the effect of *Dia. 18*, and explains why *Dia. 18* cannot be deemed a joseki.



Dia. 20


Next, an example from the fuseki, where tewari can also play an important role. In *Dia. 20* assume Black defends the corner by blocking White's approach 1 at 2. Then White plays elsewhere, but Black continues here with 4 and 6. Effectively the result is the same as if Black had played 1 in *Dia. 21*. Now we can assume that White 1 and Black 4 in *Dia. 20* cancel each other out, but Black has played a wasted move at 2. Again, at this stage a wasted move makes a huge difference. This tewari analysis illustrates why small-looking moves such as White 1 in *Dia. 20* or Black 1 in *Dia. 21* are so big in the fuseki.



Dia. 21


So much by way of introduction. Since it is now clear that many josekis can usefully be reappraised through the application of tewari principles, let us continue in that vein.

The one-space pincer in *Dia. 22* is one example. If Black 7 is at 'a', there then follow White 'b' and Black 'c', after which White gets the vital point at 'd'. Black 7 is an effort to deny White this, but the detail can be left to the joseki books. However, when Black blocks at 11, if White cuts on the outside at 12, the result up to White 16 is even according to many joseki books. But I beg to differ. A tewari analysis will show why.




Dia. 22

Dia. 23 is a well-known variation of the 5-4 joseki up to 9. If Black were to play 'a' here, followed by 'b' to 'g', we would have the same result as in *Dia. 22*. But White would never play like this. Enjoying the position up to 9 in the corner, he would, according to correct go theory, want to attack a black move at 'a' in the region of 'g'. *Dia. 22* must therefore be regarded as bad for White.




Dia. 23

Instead, White must first press at 1 in *Dia. 24*, forcing Black 2. Then he should push in at 3 and cut at 5. Black cannot then apply the axiom of capturing the cutting stone with 6 because of the 1-2 exchange.



Dia. 24

Now it is true that the position of White's triangled stones has not changed, and they are still overconcentrated, but this is offset by the fact that Black has been forced into the inefficiency of connecting at 6. This result can be regarded as even.




Dia. 25


If the ladder relationship in *Dia. 25* is all right, White can cut on the other side at 3. But,

in the right circumstances, Black may irregularly connect at 5 instead of 4, and then White 'a' and Black 'b' might follow.

In the example of *Dia. 26* White has invaded against Black's large knight's move extension. The follow-up sequence 2 to 10 is often seen. But can this be described as optimal for Black?




Dia. 26




Dia. 27

Clearly, from the standpoint of fighting technique Black 6 (extending in an area where he is strong) is slack. He ought to play 'a', leading to the result shown in *Dia. 27*, where the exchange of 7 for 14 is in his favour.

Let us back this up with a tewari analysis, as in *Dia. 28*. This is the product of *Dia. 26* with the triangled stones added. Although strictly speaking this is premature, it is nothing compared to White's point of view as he would now want to play White 1 rather than cut at 2 and see his stone gobbled up by Black 1.



Dia. 28




Dia. 29

Allied to the previous position is the fuseki problem illustrated in *Dia. 29*. If Black extends at 1, and then White invades at 2, Black can defend at 3 in good order. Black 3 is also a good point if White desists from playing here. The problem then is whether White should respond to Black 1 by invading at the 3-3 point 'a'.

Dia. 30 is the outcome of using the joseki just described. Is this not now inferior for Black, because the extension 1 is too narrow? Black 1 should be at 'a' or even beyond. Tewari analysis demonstrates that 1 is an overconcentration of influence. Therefore, if Black is unable in the first place to extend as far as 'a'


with 1, in view of white strength in that area, he should enclose the corner with 3 or 'b'.




Dia. 30

For similar tewari reasons Black should not, except in special cases and as a way of attacking White, play the double-wing extension 1 in *Dia. 31*. White invades at the 3-3 point and after the sequence to 12 the result will be a ko through Black 'b', White 'c' – but even if he loses this ko White gets two good moves elsewhere, which has to be unacceptable to Black.

If White defers the invasion, Black may get the opportunity to enclose at 3, but then the extension to 1 looks half-hearted. Somewhere around 'a' looks better.




Dia. 31



Dia. 32


In *Dia. 32*, it would be normal for Black to respond to White 3 by enclosing at 5. But if he wants to stress the centre and attack White 3, sometimes he will jump out to Black 4. Now we shall study White's countermeasure, the crosscut at 5 and 7.




Dia. 33

Following the maxim 'Extend on one side from a crosscut,' Black uncomplicatedly plays 4 in *Dia. 33*, leading to the common sequence up to 10. But tewari analysis exposes the flaw in this result.

Consider *Dia. 34*. Here Black 4 in answer to White 1 and 3 is correct. But if, after Black 10, White were to press in at 'a', would Black have any reason to defend at 'b' — in other words to recreate the result of *Dia. 33*? So go theory requires that in *Dia. 35* Black should respond to 3 with an atari at 4 and the continuation to 9 ends with sente for Black. As compared with *Dia. 33* there is a whole move difference for Black, and so he can be satisfied as far as tewari is concerned.




Dia. 34




Dia. 35

White might therefore shift to 7 in *Dia. 36*, leading to the position after 12 where Black has thickness and White connects along the upper side. If White neglects 13 in this sequence, Black will, at an opportune moment, attack at 1 and 3 in *Dia. 37* to produce a ko fight after 7.




Dia. 36



Dia. 37


Let us now analyse the result in *Dia. 36* by using tewari and comparing it with the hypothetical case of *Dia. 38* where Black has responded to the 3-4 stone with a low approach and White has blocked with the triangled stone (White 6 is played elsewhere). Black 7 and 9 are questionable but not actually bad, and after White 10 Black would do better not to play 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', but locally this is not of great consequence.



Dia. 38 (6: elsewhere)

But, assuming that, it would be horrendously bad on White's part if he were to play 'e' and invite Black 'f', amplifying Black's influence. Moreover, White's triangled stone is completely wasted — a loss of one whole move. Yet this outcome is the same as *Dia. 36*.

Now for an example of tewari analysis over the whole board. It involves sacrifice stones. Beginners generally are loath to give up stones, but there is no reason to fear this if there is compensation. Tewari can be used to prove there is compensation.



Dia. 39


In *Dia. 39* a standard joseki has been played in the upper right corner up to White 14. Black switches to 15 to take advantage of the ladder threat, and although White eliminates this with the capture at 16 Black can be satisfied with his corner enclosure.

Eventually White plays 28, expecting to force Black 'a', after which White is planning to approach at 29. But, unwilling to be pushed around, Black takes the good point of 29 himself. This is also correct from a tewari point of view, even though White now captures the corner with 30, for next Black can take another big point at 31 and thus secure the lead over the whole board.


The result is that Black has sacrificed four stones in the top right-hand corner, giving White a secure profit of over 20 points and appreciable thickness. But to offset this, Black has taken the three big points 15, 29 and 31 and he can look forward to erasing White's framework at the top later with the forcing

moves 'a' and 'b'. It is painful for White to be reduced to a lopsided game like this, relying on just one territory.

But what does tewari say? In *Dia. 40* White has used nine stones in the corner against Black's five (one captured by each side). Locally White has the dominant position, but so he should have with four extra stones invested, and do not forget that Black has had the benefit of four extra plays elsewhere. In any case, Black not only has forcing moves at 'a' and 'b': his corner stones may even yet have a spark of life in them.




Dia. 40



Dia. 41


Now if we remove the four black triangled stones, and the four white triangled stones to match, we get *Dia. 41*, which is effectively the high two-space corner enclosure with the triangled stones added. White has secured about 20 points in the corner, but had he started from scratch it is debatable whether he would have wanted to use his four stones like this just to make 20 points. Since Black's compensating stones are working well all over the board, his sacrificial strategy must be deemed a success by the criterion of tewari.



Dia. 42

Consider now the large framework (*moyo*) in *Dia. 42*. White invades at 1 to prevent Black consolidating this area. The sequence 2 to 8 is a common one, and then, as the previous example shows, from a tewari point of view it is safe for White to leave this area now and take sente.


Of course if there is no good point elsewhere he is quite free to live with 'a', but it is unlikely that there would be no alternatives at the fuseki stage.




Dia. 43

What if he does leave this area? Black can but initiate a ko as in *Dia. 43*. He will have to ignore a ko threat after capturing at 3 to complete the capture with 5. It goes without saying that this is an extra factor in calculating the profit and loss of this situation, but leaving that aside and simply applying tewari principles, if White had not invaded at the triangled point, at some suitable moment Black could have enclosed the corner with the black triangled stone. In comparison with that, in the present case Black has effectively had to use two stones to get the same effect — for which White has had satisfactory compensation elsewhere.

Dia. 44 is the *tsukenobi* (attach-and-extend) joseki again, but with a different twist. In this position, if Black blocks at 1 and White extends to 2, the cut at 'a' becomes a real proposition and Black has lost the invasion at 'b'. In short, it is very bad for Black.




Dia. 44



Dia. 45

But if White is already solid along the right side as in *Dia. 45*, so that Black has no room to invade, the correct procedure for Black is first to cut at 1 and sacrifice 1 and 3 so as to force at 5, and then to repair the defect at 9. This makes Black thick on the upper side with prospects of building a framework there.

Now consider this from a tewari standpoint. Obviously the two black stones 1 and 3 are canceled out by White 2 and 10. So the outcome is as if Black had not played 1 and 3 and had swapped 5 for 6 in sente, then forced White to reply to 9 with 4, a clear vindication of the sacrificial tactic — as proven by tewari.




Dia. 46

White can also answer the cut with 2 in Dia. 46, and after the 3–4 exchange Black has the opportunity to play at 5 (Black 6 instead would invite White 7 and leave annoying complications). If White responds to 5 by pulling out at 7, Black simply plays at 8. White 6 is therefore inevitable, then after 7 and 8 we have another tewari problem.

First we exclude two stones on each side, 1 and 3 for Black and 2 and 4 for White. The result is then as if White has responded to a push at Black 7 with an extension to 6 and then, in a position where no urgent move is required anyway, has played 8 (or it could have been 'b') in response to 5. Plainly this is a big plus for Black. It is true that from here Black would not exchange 1 and 3 for 2 and 4, but this is purely an internal matter and has no consequence for the external situation. There is no comparison with White's loss from playing the unnecessary move 8 in gote.


Bear in mind, incidentally, that Black's cut at 1 is a tactic used when White is strong on the right side, as here, and thus has his eyes on the defect at 'a'.

Here is another joseki, in Dia. 47. Black 12 is normally at 14, but this variation is possible too. White 21 has the safe alternative of descent to 22, living in the corner, but this 21 has the significance of sounding out Black's reply.



Dia. 47


Once Black lives in the corner with the hane 22, White has the variation where he plays the hanging connection 'a'; but if he plays 23 as here the result up to 28 can be expected.




Dia. 48

Turning now to a tewari analysis of this position — which has occurred in professional play — as in Dia. 48, we can eliminate the six white stones played inside Black's territory and six black stones to go with them. The result is equivalent to the moves 1 to 15 with the added exchange of the two triangled stones. This means Black has crawled six times on the third line as well as having submitted to the triangled exchange, whereas White has nothing to be dissatisfied about, and once he can cut at 'a' Black's disadvantage will be clear. Apart from anything else, in the previous diagram White had sente. The tewari analysis reveals a clear benefit to White.

Next the notorious *taisha* (big slant) joseki in Dia. 49. Black's press at 13 (or 'a') in response to 12 is often seen, and after White 14 and Black 15 joseki books recommend White to fight with the hane at 21 or to resist with the descent to 17. But the White 16 of this diagram is the rational way to play from the standpoint of tewari.



Dia. 49




Dia. 50


If Black, instead of 17, blocks at 'b', White can hane at 21, which is poor for Black. Black 17 is therefore forced, as is the rest of the sequence to 23. Now, if we remove three white stones and three offsetting black stones, we achieve the result of *Dia. 50*.

Whereas in the previous diagram it seemed disadvantageous for White to give up three stones, here we see that in fact he has reduced Black to making narrow extensions with the two triangled stones, and moreover he has in effect made Black answer the hane 1 inefficiently with 2. White, with secure profit in the corner, has every reason to be satisfied.

Naturally this is a local perspective. In the context of a whole game, Black's triangled stones may be effective, for instance in reducing white strength in the upper left corner.




Dia. 51




Dia. 52

Let us study now a common handicap joseki. White's invasion at 1 in *Dia. 51* is commonly used as a probe. Black often responds at 2 and then allows himself to be forced with 3 and 4. But as tewari analysts we have to ask ourselves whether Black would ever want to respond to 1 in *Dia. 52* not just with 2 but by going back to add a stone at 'a' later. That in effect is what he has done in *Dia. 51*.



Dia. 53




Dia. 54

Black's proper response is 2 in *Dia. 53*. White can shift 3 to 4, to which Black would descend at 'a', but with this 3 White can live in the corner. This is not at all bad for Black, for


he can build tremendous thickness, as *Dia. 54* illustrates.

Black 1 is the key move to learn (White can also live by answering 1 at 5, and that is probably better).

White may have the opportunity to complicate matters by jumping out to 1 in *Dia. 55* first, and then after 2 to 7 Black will have fallen into his trap, as a tewari comparison with *Dia. 56* shows. White 7 in the latter diagram would normally be at 'a', but this 7 is for the sake of a clearer comparison.




Dia. 55




Dia. 56

Imagine that in *Dia. 55* Black has answered White 'a' with 'b' to equate to *Dia. 56*. Then we can see that Black has in effect stupidly answered White 1 with the empty triangle at 2, or 'b' and 'c' in *Dia. 56*.

Dia. 57 shows how Black should answer White 1. Black 2 is correct, but after 3 he should shift to 4 and so avoid the loss our tewari analysis has demonstrated.



Dia. 57




Dia. 58


Dia. 58, finally, is another even-game joseki. Black 9 is normally a cut on the outside at 12. The variation here may seem possible too. However, Black's descent to 11 is dubious. Capturing at 12, allowing White to capture in turn at 11, would be simpler. The significance of Black 13 is to prevent the cut at 'a', but it is too submissive and the result after White forces Black at 14 and 16 is bad for Black. Tewari shows why.

Dia. 59 is the same position with the stones at 'a' and 'b' removed. Not only is Black's response 5 to 4 redundant, but Black has invested one stone more in this position only to be pressed into a low posture.

The conclusion has to be that Black 9 should indeed be the outside cut as shown in *Dia. 60*.



Dia. 59




Dia. 60

Two Semeai Problems: Answers


Problems given on page 46

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. If Black could win the capturing race by peeping at 1, there wouldn't be any problem. After 2, however, White has five liberties to Black's three.




Dia. 1: not so easy




Dia. 2: half right
6: at 1

Dia. 2. Black 1 is correct, but squeezing with 3 and 5 still leaves Black behind.

Dia. 3. The only way to get ahead in the semeai is to sacrifice two stones. After 11, Black is one move ahead.



Dia. 3: correct
7: at 1; 8: at 3;
10: at 1



Dia. 1: Black loses


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 and 3 reduce the corner white group to one eye, but Black loses the semeai. White's eye is so big that Black will have to play a lot of stones inside, but he won't have enough time.


Dia. 2. Black 1 is the vital point in this shape. White must intercept at 2, but then Black 3 wins the fight.

Dia. 3. If White 2, Black wins with 3. If instead Black played 3 at 'a', White might set up an approach-move ko (by throwing in on the 1-1 point, then blocking at 3).

(Kido, May 1987)



Dia. 2: Black wins




Dia. 3: Black wins

Two Tesuji Problems: Answers


Problems given on page 47

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 ensures some profit for Black. If White 'a', Black 'b' exploits White's shortage of liberties. Therefore —



Dia. 1: the tesuji




Dia. 2: best


Dia. 2. Answering at 2 is best. Black captures three stones in sente, but that can't be helped.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the move. The idea is similar to the 'crane's nest' tesuji.



Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: captured

Dia. 2. If White 2, White is helpless after Black 3 and 5. If White 2 at 4, Black 5 leads to the same result.

(Let's Go, May, June 1985)

Make It Easier to Master Go!

One of the biggest reasons you read *Go World* is to study professional games, a sure way to improve your playing strength. Here's a way to make it easier to study those games—and **double** the number of games you get with each issue of *Go World*!

Your computer offers a particularly effective way to present a game with its commentary. No longer do you have to fill in board positions between diagrams in your imagination. An exact diagram appears for each board position, including annotations. The computer displays comments and variations at just the right point during play. True, you could follow all of these lines on a physical Go board, but a single misplaced stone can spoil the whole analysis, and backing up from variations can be cumbersome and tedious. Your computer is quicker and surer. Here is a great new tool to improve your play and improve your appreciation of the artistry of the best Go players in the world!

Subscribe to *Go World on Disk* and get all of the games from each issue pre-recorded on floppy. Each quarter you will receive a data disk that contains each of the games in *Go World*, complete with commentary. Also on the disk you will find a number of other Japanese, Korean, and Chinese professional games, plus significant amateur games. We have never had room to include these other games in the printed edition of *Go World*, but now you can get them on disk.

To read *Go World on Disk* you'll need *GoScribe*—a game recording and playback program that allows you to record, comment, edit, and annotate your Go games. The newly released *GoScribe 2.0* includes an excellent, menu-driven, graphic interface, good commentary editing capabilities, an automatic what's-the-next-move problem capability, support of play variations, laser printer support, and more. If you just want to playback pre-recorded games, *GoView* is a special, less expensive version without recording capabilities.

As a special offer to new subscribers to *Go World on Disk*, you can save \$20 on the purchase of *GoScribe* or *GoView*! *GoScribe* is only available in IBM format, but Macintosh users can get full playback and many of the recording capabilities with our *Contender* Go-playing program. And, you can get \$20 off on its purchase when you subscribe. (Previous owners of *Contender* will need to upgrade to the March release—just send in your old program disk with your subscription for a FREE upgrade.)

Send your order in today so you can be sure to receive the inaugural issue of *Go World on Disk*. Please specify whether you want IBM, 5.25" or 3.5" disk, or Macintosh format. A year's subscription to *Go World on Disk* is just \$40 on 5.25" floppy or \$46 on 3.5" (either IBM or Macintosh). Subscribers outside North America should add \$10 for surface mail or \$20 for airmail. *GoScribe* is \$59.95, *GoView* \$20, and *Contender* \$49.95. Don't forget to knock \$20 off these prices for subscribing to *Go World on Disk*! Shipping is \$3 in North America, \$4 overseas surface or \$7 overseas airmail. California residents please add 7.25% sales tax for the program only. Please send your remittance in U.S. dollars, check drawn on a U.S. bank. We are happy to accept VISA or Mastercard orders by mail, phone, or FAX. International Postal Money Orders are also acceptable. Send to: Ishi Press International, 1400 N. Shoreline Blvd, Bldg A7, Mt. View, CA 94043 USA, Tel: (415) 964-7294, FAX: (415) 964-7509

